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PERSPECTIVES FROM THE RULE OF LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: ARE THERE
LESSONS FOR THE REFORM OF JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE
UNITED STATES?
NoRMAN L. GREENE t
The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the
basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions,
improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences,
direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
Most U.S. judges and court reform organizations regard elections
as a poor method for selecting judges. They believe judges can be influ-
enced by the fear of electoral retaliation against decisions that conform
to the law but not popular preferences. They also fear that judges may
compromise their independence by incurring obligations to those who
provide financial support to their election campaigns.2
t Copyright © 2009 by Norman L. Greene. Norman L. Greene is a graduate of Columbia
College and New York University School of Law and a member of the firm of Schoeman Updike &
Kaufman, LLP, New York, N.Y. He has written many articles, a number of which are cited here,
and made and organized many presentations, on judicial reform. The author recognizes the editorial
and research assistance of the Denver University Law Review, especially Katie Bowers, Senior
Editor, and Michael Smith, Editor-in-Chief, for their exceptional, tireless and enthusiastic work on
this article.
In writing this article, the author took an open and collaborative approach and reached out
to experienced international and domestic law practitioners and scholars in a variety of disciplines.
A partial list in alphabetical order includes distinguished members of the American Bar Association,
Rule of Law Initiative; the American Society of International Law; Development Alternatives, Inc.
(DAD; the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC); the National Center for State Courts; the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID); the United States Department of
State; the World Bank; academia; and the judiciary: e.g., Elizabeth Andersen, Daniel Berkowitz,
Ronald Brand, Anthony Champagne, Wade Channell, Donald Chisholm, Melanne Civic, Simon
Conte, Kenneth Dam, Kevin Davis, Martha Dye, Robinson Everett, Kevin Fandl, Rob Fleck, Tom
Ginsburg, Richard Gold, F. Andrew Hanssen, Ann Hudock, Erik Jensen, William Kaschak, Linda
Camp Keith, Stuart Kerr, Rachel Kleinfeld, Aart Kraay, Evelyn Lance, Robert Leventhal, Richard
Messick, John K.M. Ohnesorge, Luis Ore, H. Kathleen Patchel, Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Hon. Rich-
ard Posner, Kristi Ragan, Anita Ramasastry, Joe Siegle, Robert Stein, Matthew Stephenson, Brian
Tamanaha, Frank Upham, Mark Walter and Franck Wiebe, and the author thanks them for their
collegiality, generosity and in certain cases, inspiration. The author also acknowledges the support
of Altria Client Services Inc. in connection with the preparation of this article. Responsibility for
any statement contained in this article is solely that of the author rather than that of any person or
entity acknowledged here.
I. Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative, U.N. Basic Principles on the Independence
of the Judiciary 2 (2004), http://www.abanet.org/rollprograms/resource-judicial-reform.html (follow
"UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary" hyperlink).
2. Mira Gur-Arie & Russell Wheeler, Judicial Independence in the United States: Current
Issues and Relevant Background Information, in GUIDANCE FOR PROMOTING JUDICIAL
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INTRODUCTION
I have learned through multiple conversations and extensive study
that American writers on domestic judiciaries and American writers on
foreign judiciaries seem to be on separate paths. They often publish in
different places, and if they read each other's work, it is not obvious
from some or perhaps much of what I have read. Not too long ago, I was
on one of those separate paths myself (the domestic one) until I was told,
in substance, by a friend who was on the other one (the international and
rule of law one) that "the issues on both paths are really the same, don't
you know?" This simple but perceptive thought gave me an entirely new
perspective. The objectives of this article include joining the two paths,
applying to the domestic sphere perspectives from the field of rule of law
and international economic development, inspiring further scholarship,
and starting on the road toward positive change.
This article will consider whether a relationship exists between
good business and a fair and impartial judiciary; if so, whether a compel-
ling domestic economic rationale for American judicial reform may be
identified; and if so, how it may be achieved. It will begin by focusing
on the international principles of rule of law originating in work spon-
sored by international financial institutions and other governmental and
non-governmental organizations, which have disbursed billions of dollars
to improve judicial systems in developing countries. These principles
include key components of the rule of law, such as judicial impartiality,
independence,3 competence, and accountability; 4 and they are applicable
INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY 133, 140 (rev. ed., USAID Office of Democracy and Governance
2002), available at http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/democracy-and-governance/publications/pdfs/
pnacm007.pdf.
3. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & RONALD J. DANIELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM AND
DEVELOPMENT 61-63 (2008); Pamela S. Karlan, Judicial Independences, 95 GEO. L.J. 1041, 1042-43
(2007); see also Suleimanu Kumo, The Rule of Law and Independence of the Judiciary Under the
Sharia, 8 J. ISLAMIC & COMP. L. 100, 103 (1978) ("The principle of the rule of law is inextricably
mixed with the principle of independence of the judiciary. The latter principle means, in effect, that
judges shall enjoy immunity from interference by the government and [be free] to decide issues
before them only in accordance with the law without fear of adverse repercussions. This is secured
in modem constitutions, by provisions laying down well defined procedures for appointments to the
higher judicial offices, charging judicial salaries on the consolidated fund thus giving them fixed
salaries and excluding these from parliamentary debates and by the procedure for their removal from
office."); Sam Rugege, Judicial Independence in Rwanda, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. &
DEV. L.J. 411, 411, 415 (2007) (noting the relationship between the rule of law and judicial inde-
pendence as well as economic progress: "Judicial independence is a universally recognized princi-
ple in democratic societies. It is a prerequisite for a society to operate on the basis of the rule of
law," and citing the Asian Development Bank for the following proposition:
The cornerstone of successful reform is the effective independence of the judiciary. That
is a prerequisite for an impartial, efficient and reliable judicial system. Without judicial
independence, there can be no rule of law, and without the rule of law the conditions are
not in place for the efficient operation of an open economy, so as to ensure conditions of
legal security and foreseeability.)
See also Evelyn Lance, Commentary, Emerging Democracies Get Help from Isles, HONOLULU
ADVERTISER, May 2, 2005 at I, available at http://www.courts.state.hi.us/attach-
ment/7337E1F0797A8F54EB5741B062/edghfi050205.pdf (noting that "many [emerging democra-
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to the United States as well as to other countries.5 This article will also
consider the basis for linking the rule of law and economic development,
various causation controversies affecting the linkage, and the likely eco-
nomic consequences of rule of law violations. It will then assess state
court judicial elections in the United States in light of the rule of law,
whether the American practice of judicial elections is consistent with the
rule of law, and the potential economic implications.
The article concludes that a sufficient connection between the rule
of law and sustainable economic progress (whether called development
or growth) has been demonstrated to warrant the concern of governmen-
tal and nongovernmental policymakers, both at home and abroad; that
the principles of the rule of law and economic development apply do-
mestically as well as internationally; that state court judicial elections
create or appear to create rule of law violations in the United States; and
that Americans most concerned about the welfare of our economy should
work for the elimination of state court elections in the United States.
I. THE RULE OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
A. The Enormous International Commitment to Promoting Rule of Law
The notion that the rule of law promotes economic development is
built on various factors, including common sense, practical assumptions,
logic, and to some extent, empirical studies.6 Based on this level of
knowledge, policymakers have made decisions and taken action, includ-
cies] .. recognize that a strong, independent and professional judiciary ... is an essential element
of a free, orderly and economically vital society").
4. See TREBILCOCK & DANIELS, supra note 3, at 63-65; see also Stefan Voigt, The Economic
Effects of Judicial Accountability: Some Preliminary Insights, 27 (Int'l Ctr. for Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 19, 2005) (considering the relationship between the rule of law and judicial
accountability as well as economic progress):
In this paper, the hypothesis that judicial independence and judicial accountability are not
necessarily competing ends but can be complementary means toward achieving impartial-
ity and, in turn, the rule of law is presented. It is argued that judicial accountability can
increase economic growth through various channels[,] one of which is the reduction of
corruption. Id.
... Independent judges who are not accountable and do not incur any cost for such be-
havior, will prevent the judiciary from unfolding its potentially beneficial consequences.
A low degree of [judicial accountability] can thus increase uncertainty with regard to the
status of the promises made by the legislature [i.e., the laws passed by the legislature,
with reference to private property]. Higher levels of uncertainty are expected to induce
lower aggregate investment and thus lower levels of economic growth.
Id. at 10-11. See also id. at 27 (Voigt recommends further research to test his article's theories).
5. The general applicability of the principles of judicial impartiality, independence, compe-
tence, and accountability to the United States judiciary is self-evident. In support of the general
applicability of the rule of law to the United States, see, for example, World Justice Project, Domes-
tic Mainstreaming of the Rule of Law, http://www.worldjusticeproject.org/domestic-mainstreaming
(last visited Nov. 4, 2008). See also Symposium, Is the Rule of Law Waning in America?, 56
DEPAUL L. REV. 223 (2007).
6. See generally John K.M. Ohnesorge, The Rule of Law, 3 ANN. REV. OF L. & Soc. SC. 99,
100(2007).
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ing disbursing extraordinary sums of money to promote the rule of law as
a key component of international assistance to developing countries.7
Policymakers are on a timetable: they need to make decisions now on
the basis of the knowledge that they have to try to improve or not im-
prove foreign legal systems. If they decide to take action, they must de-
cide what kind of action to take and where.
At the same time, an academic debate proceeds over what we know
about the subject, including: what is the rule of law; what is economic
development; do improvements to the rule of law promote economic
development; what is the measure of each; does economic development
in turn bring about a demand for the rule of law; does it do so every-
where; are there exceptions; what caused the exceptions; do they matter;
and how do we know and prove the connection between the rule of law
and economic development. Is the connection just an association, per-
haps a correlation, or is there demonstrated causation? Is there empirical
evidence of this; if so, how much; and how much is necessary? If not,
what evidence should we obtain and how should we obtain it? The aca-
demic discourse is divided, sometimes tentative, other times assertive,
and often calls for further research, but it forms a vast literature.
The effort in the "field of law and economic development ... has
been lead [sic] by the international financial institutions (TFIs)-the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Asian Devel-
opment Bank, etc.-by the aid and development arms of the U.S. gov-
ernment and the European Union, and to a lesser extent by NGOs.... In
this context, the Rule of Law is understood as being related to economic
development and the workings of a market economy, rather than as a set
of normative political commitments." 8 These and other organizations,
such as and including the Inter-American Development Bank, the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA) through its Rule of Law Initiative (ABA
ROLl) 9 and its diverse activities, have disbursed or overseen the dis-
bursement of billions of dollars.10 The many activities of ABA ROLl
7. See, e.g., TREBILCOCK & DANIELS, supra note 3, at 2.
8. Ohnesorge, supra note 6, at 100.
9. See American Bar Association, About the ABA Rule of Law Initiative,
http://www.abanet.org/rol/about.shtml (last visited Oct. 17, 2008) ("The Rule of Law Initiative
(ABA ROLl) is a mission driven, non-profit organization with an annual budget of over $30 million.
The Rule of Law Initiative's primary funders are the United Agency for International Development
(USAID), the Department of State, and the Department of Justice. It also receives funding from
foundations, private individuals, law firms and corporations.").
10. Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey of the Issues,
14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117, 117 (1999); Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform: The Why,
the What, and the How I (Mar. 15-17, 2002), http://www.pogar.org/publications/judiciary
/messick/reform.pdf. The work of some of the involved organizations includes: for ABA ROLl's
judicial reform program, see American Bar Association, Judicial Reform Programs,
http://www.abanet.org/rol/programs/judicial-reform.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2008); for the World
Bank, see The World Bank, Judicial Reform, http://tinyurl.com59njp9 (last visited Oct. 17, 2008);
for the Inter-American Development Bank, see Inter-American Development Bank, A Decade of
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appear on its website and are too extensive to catalog, but cover numer-
ous countries and projects in the area of legal reform, including gender
equality projects. 1
Judicial Reform, http://www.iadb.org/news/articledetail.cfm?language-EN&artid=2127 (last visited
Oct. 17, 2008) ("The reform of Latin America's judicial systems, once considered a specialized
concern of judges and lawyers, is now at the center of the region's development agenda, 1DB Presi-
dent Enrique V. Iglesias said at a recent conference."); for USAID, see USAID, Strengthening the
Rule of Law & Respect for Human Rights, http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/democ-
racy-and-govemance/rol.html, (last visited Oct. 17, 2008) ("[Clivil and commercial codes that
respect private property and contracts are key ingredients for the development of market-based
economies. USAID's efforts to strengthen legal systems fall under three inter-connected priority
areas: supporting legal reform, improving the administration of justice, and increasing citizens'
access to justice."); for the Asian Development Bank, see Eveline N. Fischer, Deputy Gen. Counsel,
Asian Dev. Bank, Lessons Learned from Judicial Reform: The ADB Experience (Oct. 20, 2006)
("Since 1995, international donors have invested more than US$1.0 billion in legal and judicial
reform work-for good reason. Strong rules-based institutions promote economic growth. A fair,
independent and efficient judiciary supports equitable development."),
http://www.adb.org/Media/Articles/2006/10829-speech-Eveline-Fischer/; and for the 1MF, see, e.g.,
Press Release, International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Approves Three-Year US
$75.8 Million Stand-By Arrangement for Macedonia (Sept. 15, 2005) ("Comprehensive judicial
reform, to be implemented over several years, will create a fairer and more predictable framework
for business activity by increasing the independence and professionalism of judges, eliminating court
delays, and removing misdemeanors and administrative cases from the regular courts."),
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/pr/2005/pr05l96.htm.
Although not an aid-dispensing organization, Transparency International "raises aware-
ness and diminishes apathy and tolerance of corruption, and devises and implements practical ac-
tions to address it." Transparency International, About Transparency International,
http://www.transparency.org/about-us (last visited Oct.17, 2008). It has likewise recognized a
connection between judicial reform-specifically, eradication of corruption, economic progress and
other societal needs. See Transparency International, Other Thematic Issues,
http://www.transparency.org/global-priorities /other thematic-issues/judiciary (last visited Oct. 17,
2008) ("It is difficult to overstate the negative impact of a corrupt judiciary: it erodes the ability of
the international community to tackle transnational crime and terrorism; it diminishes trade, eco-
nomic growth and human development; and most importantly, it denies citizens impartial settlement
of disputes with neighbors or the authorities."); Mary Noel Pepys, Corruption within the judiciary:
causes and remedies, in TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007 3
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2007), available at http://www.transparency.org/publica-
tions/gcr/download.gcr/download.gcr_2007#download; see also Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing
Definitions of the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF
KNOWLEDGE 39 (Thomas Carothers ed., Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace 2006) [hereinafter
PROMOTING]("Real equality before the law requires courts that are strong and independent enough
to enforce it. It also depends particularly on a lack of corruption within the judiciary, because the
rich can use bribes to escape equal justice.").
See also the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) Rule of Law program, which seeks to
advance "peace through the development of democratic legal and governmental systems." United
States Institute of Peace, http://www.usip.org/specialists/bios/current/kritz.html (last visited Oct. 28,
2008). Also, the "USIP's Rule of Law Program works to assist institutions and processes that wiU
best bring about law-based management of international conflict and a sense of justice. The program
is based on the premise that adherence to the rule of law entails far more than the mechanical appli-
cation of static legal technicalities; it requires an evolutionary search for those institutions and proc-
esses that will best bring about authentic stability through justice." http://www.usip.org/
ruleoflaw/about.htmi (last visited October 28, 2008). For general information about USIP, see
http://www.usip.org/aboutus/index.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
11. Specifically, the ABA's Rule of Law Initiative is involved in the following substantive
areas: anti-corruption, criminal law reform and human trafficking, gender issues, human rights and
conflict mitigation, judicial reform, legal education reform and legal profession reform. See Ameri-
can Bar Association, supra note 10. Also, it is involved in over forty countries in Africa (including
North Africa), Asia, Europe and Eurasia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Middle East. Id.
Among the many efforts of the Rule of Law Initiative has been the Arab Women's Legal Network
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For example, according to a 2002 report:
The World Bank, the Interamerican [sic] Development Bank, and the
Asian Development Bank have extended over $800 million in loans
for judicial reform .... [T]he United Nations Development Program,
the European Union and its member states, and the American, Aus-
tralian, Canadian, and Japanese governments have provided signifi-
cant grant aid to help developing nations improve the operation of the
judicial branch of government.
12
The World Bank reports having lent $273.2 million in 2002, $530.9
million in 2003, $503.4 million in 2004, $303.8 million in 2005, $757.6
million in 2006, and $424.5 million in 2007 on rule of law initiatives.
1 3
As one commentator noted, there has been a "massive surge in develop-
ment assistance for law reform projects in developing and transition
economies involving investments of many billions of dollars. The World
Bank alone reports that it has supported 330 'rule of law' projects and
spent $2.9 billion on this sector since 1990.,
14
(AWLN), for which the ABA has provided "technical assistance and capacity-building support."
See Arab Women's Legal Network Holds General Meeting in Amman, ABA RULE OF LAW
INITIATIVE, July 9, 2007, http://www.abanet
.org/rollnews/news jordan-awln-general-meeting.shtml. The idea of the AWLN was conceived in
February 2004 at a conference in Amman, Jordan, and the network was formally launched in 2005.
See ABA Rule of Law Initiative, The Arab Women's Legal Network,
http://www.abanet.org/rol/mena/awln.shtml (last visited Sept. 19, 2008). The purpose of the AWLN
included considering and advancing issues facing women in the legal profession and women's rights
generally. Id.; see also U.S. Dep't of State, Women and the Law-A Regional Dialogue: Conference
Summary, Observations, and Conclusions (2004 Amman conference),
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/31797 .htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
Two of the persons acknowledged in this article were involved with the AWLN, one
Evelyn Lance, in the AWLN's formative phase at the 2004 Amman conference, see, for example,
Lance, supra note 3, and the other, Martha Dye, in managing the North African segment of the
program supporting the AWLN. See, e.g., A Bulletin for CEELI Staff, Volunteers and Friends
Around the World, Women Legal Professionals Come Together for ABA Training in Morocco, May
20, 2005, available at http://mail.abanet.org/scripts/wa.exe?A3=ind0505&L=ROLENEWS&E=quoted-
printable&P=75739&B=-%3DNextPart_001_01C55D4D.13469F2C&T=text%2Fhtml;%20charset
=iso-8859-1.
12. Messick, Judicial Reform: The Why, the What, and the How, supra note 10, at 1; see also
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE RULE OF LAW FUNDiNG WORLDWIDE FOR
FISCAL YEARS 1993-98 2-3 (1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99158.pdf:
Based on the funding data that cognizant departments and agencies made available, the
United States provided at least $970 million in rule of law assistance to countries
throughout the world during fiscal years 1993-98 .... At least 35 entities from various
U.S. departments and agencies have a role in U.S. rule of law assistance programs. The
Departments of State and Justice and USAID are the principal organizations providing
rule of law training, technical advice, and related assistance. The Department of Defense,
the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), numerous law enforcement agencies and bureaus,
and other U.S. departments and agencies also have a direct role.
Id. Research has not disclosed an updated study by the General Accounting Office.
13. THE WORLD BANK, SUMMARY OF FISCAL YEAR AcrIvrrTIEs 55 (2007),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTANNREP2K7Resources/AR07Section3.pdf.
14. TREBILCOCK & DANIELS, supra note 3, at 2; see also Economics and the Rule of Law:
Order in the Jungle, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 13, 2008, available at http://www.economist.
com/displaystory.cfm?story-id=10849115 ("Western donors have poured billions into rule-of-law
projects over the past 20 years.").
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The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is a United States
government corporation that provides aid to countries meeting certain
levels of satisfactory standards of good governance. 15 Founded in 2004,
the "MCC is based on the principle that aid is most effective when it
reinforces good governance, economic freedom and investments in peo-
ple." 16  Eligibility for grants depends, among other things, on whether
the country meets certain thresholds in particular categories. These cate-
gories include: "Ruling Justly" indicators, consisting of "Political
Rights" and "Civil Liberties" (measured by Freedom House indexes);
"Control of Corruption;" "Government Effectiveness;" "Rule of Law;"
and "Voice and Accountability" (measured by World Bank Institute in-
dexes). 17 Using these indicators, the MCC evaluates countries on, among
other things, "public confidence in the ... judicial system; ... strength
and impartiality of the legal system; . . . independence, effectiveness,
predictability, and integrity of the judiciary; . . . [and the training of
judges] in order to carry out justice in a fair and unbiased manner.',
18
Eligibility does not require minimum scores in all indicators. 19 The pur-
pose of the indicators is "to identify countries with policy environments
that will allow Millennium Challenge Account funding to be effective in
reducing poverty and promoting economic growth.
20
Rule of law reform includes both judicial reform and overall legal
reform.2 ' What falls into the category of judicial reform or legal reform
15. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Fact-Sheet: The Millennium Challenge
Corporation and Political Reform in the Arab World, http://www.camegieendowment
.org/files/mccfactsheetl .pdf.
16. Millennium Challenge Corporation, About MCC, http://www.mcc.gov/about/index.php
(last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
17. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, supra note 15.
18. Millennium Challenge Corporation, Guide to the MCC Indicators and the Selection Proc-
ess: Fiscal Year 2008 16-17 (2008) http://www.mca.gov/documents/mcc-fy08-guidetoindicators
andtheselectionprocess.pdf.
19. Morocco received in August 2007 a $698 million five-year compact, despite passing only
two of the six "Ruling Justly" indicators, in light of its qualification in other categories of eligibility.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, supra note 15. Some countries which might not
otherwise qualify for funding from the Millennium Challenge Corporation may meet the test for
threshold funding. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of State, Millennium Challenge Corporation Board
of Directors Announces 2007 Threshold Countries: Niger; Peru; and Rwanda (Nov. 8, 2008), avail-
able at http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/76110.htm ("MCC's Threshold Program is designed to assist
countries on the 'threshold' of Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) eligibility for Compact assis-
tance. Threshold countries must demonstrate a commitment to reforms that will address the specific
policy weaknesses identified by the MCA eligibility criteria.").
Improving conditions in developing nations, of course, requires attention to sectors in
addition to rule of law reform in an integrated approach. See Office of the Coordinator for Recon-
struction and Stabilization, Western Hemisphere Planning and Development Section, Active Re-
sponse Corps Regional Deployment, Port-au-Prince, Haiti,
http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=4RPF (last visited Dec. 7,
2008) (mentioning security and police, judicial improvement, good governance and community
building, and economic and infrastructure development).
20. Millennium Challenge Corporation, supra note 18, at 2.
21. Cf. Kleinfeld, supra note 10, at 47 ("Although most legal scholars define the rule of law
by its ends, most programs to build the rule of law implicitly define the rule of law by its institu-
tional attributes. . . . Internally, most practitioner organizations rarely use the words rule-of-law
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"blurs at the margin," but the "core of a judicial reform program typi-
cally consists of measures to improve the operation of the judicial branch
of government and related [or supporting] entities such as bar associa-
tions and law schools. 22 This includes "changes in the ways in which
judges are selected, evaluated, and disciplined to ensure that decisions
are insulated from improper influences. 23  Overall legal reform may
include drafting and revising legislation as well. 24 Increasing compensa-
tion and respect for the judiciary are also concerns.25
Reforms need not involve transplanting "complicated legal systems
that work well in rich countries" to poorer countries "without significant
modification., 26 The subject of legal transplantation-what is successful
or unsuccessful and why-is one of some complexity; however, merely
transplanting an institution from one place to another does not insure that
the institution will be functional or effective when it arrives at its destina-
tion.27 The "'hasty transplant syndrome' is a critical problem in legal
reform and instead discuss legal reform, judicial reform, and police (or law enforcement) reform.");
Carothers, The Problem of Knowledge, in PROMOTING, supra note 10, at 20 ("[T]he terms judicial
reform and rule-of-law reform [are] often used interchangeably," but "[tihe question of which insti-
tutions are most germane to the establishment of the rule of law in a country is actually quite com-
plex and difficult.").
22. Messick, Judicial Reform: The Why, the What, and the How, supra note 10, at 4. See
Kleinfeld, supra note 10, at 48 ("As practitioners have tried to reform these primary institutions
[such as the judiciary], however, they have found that they rely on the proper functioning of a large
and ever-growing array of essential supporting institutions.... The judiciary is reliant on magis-
trates' schools, law schools, bar associations, clerks and administrative workers, and other support-
ing groups .... As new supporting institutions are discovered and deemed to be essential, they are
added to the list of areas in need of reform.").
23. Messick, Judicial Reform: The Why, the What, and the How, supra note 10, at 5.
24. Id. at 4.
25. Kleinfeld, supra note 10, at 59 ("When judges are underpaid and underrespected, corrup-
tion can take hold, forcing difficult choices between increasing judicial independence and achieving
predictable, equitable justice.").
26. Juan Carlos Botero et al., Judicial Reform, 18 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 61, 83
(2003). See also id. at 77 ("Poor countries, or countries without a developed judicial tradition,
should probably concentrate on instituting simple rules and procedures that are easy to enforce. A
legal system that will do perfect justice in infinite time and at infinite cost is probably a luxury that
the poor can ill afford."); Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Develop-
ment, 13 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1, 5 (1998) (recommending simple rules "for the kind of
weak judiciary that one is apt to find in a poor country" because, among other reasons, they put
"fewer demands on the time and the competence of the judges" and therefore are less costly and
make decision-making "more likely to be accurate.").
27. See Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163, 167 (2003)
(classifying countries into those that developed their formal legal order internally ("origins") and
those that received their formal legal order from other countries ("transplants")). Considering recep-
tive and unreceptive transplants, the authors note that "[t]he most common complaint is that while
the transplanted law is now on the books, the enforcement of these new laws is quite ineffective."
Id. at 165; see id. at 179. See also Stephan Haggard et al., The Rule of Law and Economic Develop-
ment, 11 ANNu. REV. POLIT. ScI. 205, 221 (2008) ("[I]nstitutions do not necessarily have the same
effects when transplanted from one context to another. To redeploy the memorable line of former
Brazilian minister Luis Carlos Bresser Pereira, 'institutions can at most be imported, never ex-
ported."') (citation omitted); MASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS 2 (MIT Press 2001) (noting that "a borrowed institution may be neither enforceable nor
functional" under certain circumstances); KATHARINA PISTOR, THE STANDARDIZATION OF LAW
AND ITS EFFECT ON DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 15 (United Nations Publ'n 2000), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/pogdsmdpbg24d4.en.pdf (distinguishing between merely having "the
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reform assistance, which 'involves using foreign laws as a model for a
new country, without sufficient translation and adaptation of the laws
into the local legal culture.'
' 28
B. The Linkage Between the Rule of Law and Economic Development at
Home and Abroad
1. Definition of the Rule of Law
The concept of the rule of law has been traced to "political theorists
like Aristotle, Montesquieu and Locke, who were concerned with devis-
ing limits to the power of the government., 29 In the case of Aristotle, the
concept appears in the sense of "judging the case rather than the parties"
and showing impartiality. 30 The phrase "rule of law" itself has been at-
tributed to British jurist Albert Venn Dicey in 1885.31 The phrase is sus-
ceptible to varying definitions from the limited to the substantial.
For example, definitions of the rule of law have been described as
broad and variable; it has been called a "notoriously plastic phrase.,
32
The phrase "rule of law" is not a "legal term of art.",33  Commentators
have varying views of its utility. One extreme view is that the phrase has
best laws on the books" and "establishment of effective legal institutions," which are not necessarily
the same thing). Pistor "warns against viewing legal standards as a panacea for building effective
legal systems around the world." Id. at 17.
28. Wade Channell, Lessons Not Learned About Legal Reform, in PROMOTING, supra note 10,
at 139. "In some egregious cases, reformers simply translate a law from one language to another,
change references to the country through search-and-replace commands, and then have the law
passed by a compliant local legislature. The result is generally an ill-fitting law that does not 'take'
in its new environment as evidenced by inadequate implementation." Id. at 139-40. The mistaken
assumption is that if one would
simply help countries adopt the laws that have been proven to support economic devel-
opment, such development would follow .... In some sense, this approach could be
compared to a hypothetical orchard development program in which analysts recognize
that healthy orchards all have a certain quality of apples. The analysts then fly in apples,
tie them to the local trees, and momentarily assume success because the result looks like
an orchard.
Id. at 145. See also Kleinfeld, supra note 10, at 52 ("reformers tend to waste time and scarce legal
resources within developing countries in efforts to make laws and institutions look like those in their
own system.").
29. Alvaro Santos, The World Bank's Uses of the 'Rule of Law' Promise in Economic Devel-
opment, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRrrICAL APPRAISAL 257 (David M.
Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (citation omitted). A history of the rule of law commencing
with the ancient Greeks appears in BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY,
POLITICS, THEORY (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004); however, Tamanaha's book does not cover the
subject of the rule of law and economic development.
30. Richard Posner, The Role of the Judge in the 21st Century, 86 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1049,
1057 (2006) (internal citation omitted). See id. at 1057:
[A] defining ... element of the judicial protocol is what Aristotle called corrective jus-
tice. That means judging the case rather than the parties, an aspiration given symbolic ex-
pression in statues of justice as a blindfolded goddess and in the judicial oath requiring
judges to make decisions without respect to persons. It is also the essential meaning of
the "rule of law."
31. TREBILCOCK & DANIELS, supra note 3, at 15.
32. Matthew C. Stephenson, A Trojan Horse in China?, in PROMOTING, supra note 10, at 196.
33. Ohnesorge, supra note 6, at 101.
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no meaning: "The 'rule of law' means whatever one wants it to mean.
It's an empty vessel that everyone can fill up with their own vision., 34 If
rule of law just means the "rule of good law," the term is useless, since
"'we have no need to be converted to the rule of law just in order to dis-
cover that to believe in it is to believe that good should triumph."'
' 35
"Everyone uses the phrase because everyone can get behind it and it
might make it easier to get funding., 36 "The rule of law... stands in the
peculiar state of being the preeminent legitimating political ideal in the
world today, without agreement upon precisely what it means. 37
One commentator observed that "[w]hen an American writes or
speaks on [the rule of law] he usually begins with a confident assumption
that everybody knows what the rule of law is and then devotes the rest of
his time to a bold and eloquent statement in favor of it."'38  Another
commentator noted the following:
Our tradition has produced no agreed definition of the Rule of Law,
and there is no important tradition of academic analysis and explica-
tion of the term .... Few American law students study jurisprudence
(legal philosophy), and it is safe to say that the overwhelming major-
ity of American law students never address the Rule of Law concept
in any systematic way.39
The rule of law should not be the rule of any law, regardless of its
content, however. Although that may enhance predictability, such a rule
of law would be "compatible with a regime of laws with inequitable or
evil content"; and it "may actually strengthen the grip of an authoritarian
regime by enhancing its efficiency and by according it a patina of legiti-
macy.
40
34. Stephenson, supra note 32, at 196.
35. Id. (citing Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, 93 L. Q. REv. at 195-96 (1977)).
See also TAmANAHA, supra note 29, at 113 ("The rule of law cannot be about everything good that
people desire from government. The persistent temptation to read it this way is a testament to the
symbolic power of the rule of law, but it should not be indulged.").
36. Stephenson, supra note 32, at 196.
37. TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 4. See also id. at 1 ("[T]here appears to be widespread
agreement, traversing all fault lines, on one point, and one point alone: that the 'rule of law' is good
for everyone.").
38. Harry W. Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COL. L. REv. 143, 145 (1958).
39. Ohnesorge, supra note 6, at 102. Minimalist or thin theories of the Rule of Law empha-
size "form and procedure" rather than a set of "substantive rights or norms," and "maximalist, or
thick theories" include "references to democracy and core human rights." Id.
40. TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 120; id. at 95-96 ('qhe rule of law in the service of an
immoral legal regime would be immoral. Clarity and consistency of application with respect to
pernicious laws-like legalized slavery-makes the system more evil, enhancing its draconian
efficiency and malicious effect .... To see formal legality as moral in itself can have hazardous
consequences for a populace."). See also Norman L. Greene, A Perspective on Nazis in the Court-
room, Lessons from the Conduct of Lawyers and Judges Under the Laws of the Third Reich and
Vichy, France, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1124-25 (1995); Economics and the Rule of Law: Order in
the Jungle, supra note 14, at 84 ("America's southern states in the Jim Crow era were governed by
the rule of law on thin definitions, but not on thick.").
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The World Justice Project has identified four "universal" principles
comprising its "working definition" of the rule of law, embodying,
among other things, fairness, accountability, independence, and compe-
tence:
1. The government and its officials and agents are accountable under
the law;
2. The laws are clear, publicized, stable and fair, and protect funda-
mental rights, including the security of persons and property;
3. The process by which the laws are enacted, administered and en-
forced is accessible, fair and efficient;
4. The laws are upheld, and access to justice is provided, by compe-
tent, independent, and ethical law enforcement officials, attorneys or
representatives, and judges, who are of sufficient number, have ade-
quate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they
41
serve.
Another view likewise ascribes to the rule of law three elements,
which generally require that the courts should be accessible, independ-
ent, impartial and accountable:
The rule of law is a tradition of decision, a tradition embodying at
least three indispensable elements: first, that every person whose in-
terests will be affected by a judicial or administrative decision has the
right to a meaningful "day in court"; second, that deciding officers
shall be independent in the full sense, free from external direction by
political and administrative superiors in the disposition of individual
cases and inwardly free from the influence of personal gain and parti-
san or popular bias; and third, that day-to-day decisions shall be rea-
soned, rationally justified, in terms that take due account both of the
demands of general principle and the demands of the particular situa-
42tion.
In turn, judicial impartiality and independence are captured by the
notions that decisions "are reached on the factual and legal merits of the
41. World Justice Project, http://www.worldjusticeproject.org/about (last visited Nov. 4,
2008).
42. Jones, supra note 38, at 145, cited with approval in Ohnesorge, supra note 6, at 101-02.
See also Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, in PROMOTING supra note 10, at 4, noting that
[t]he rule of law can be defined as a system in which the laws are public knowledge, are
clear in meaning, and apply equally to everyone. They enshrine and uphold the political
and civil liberties that have gained status as universal human rights over the last half-
century. In particular, anyone accused of a crime has the right to a fair, prompt hearing
and is presumed innocent until proved guilty. The central institutions of the legal system,
including courts, prosecutors, and police, are reasonably fair, competent, and efficient.
Judges are impartial and independent, not subject to political influence or manipulation.
Perhaps most important, the government is embedded in a comprehensive legal frame-
work, its officials accept that the law will be applied to their own conduct, and the gov-
ernment seeks to be law-abiding.
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issues before the court, uninfluenced by considerations that are extrane-
ous to those merits, such as personal relations between the judge and one
of the parties, corruption, cronyism, political interference or coercion in
particular decisions, especially those affecting the government of the day
or its officials." 43  Judicial accountability, among other things, includes
such matters as the quality of the decision-making process, compliance
with judicial codes of conduct, and the efficiency of judicial administra-
tion.44
Different concepts of the rule of law are peculiarly referred to as
"thick" or "thin," depending on the number and kinds of requirements
they contain, and have been shown in a sliding scale. 45 The thickest ver-
sions contain individual rights, including some social welfare concepts.46
For example, the World Justice Project's concept of the rule of law is not
merely one of formalistic legality, but expressly includes concepts of
fairness, competence, and the protection of "fundamental rights." Its
definition appears to fall within the "thicker" part of the scale.
The notion of the "rule of law, not of men" has sometimes been
considered an alternative view of the rule of law.47 This is subject to the
caveat that human participation cannot be divorced from the operation of
law since laws do not apply or interpret themselves.48 It is a valuable
reminder that judges should "apply a relevant body of rules to a situa-
tion," rather than "do as they please ...without regard to rules. 4 9
43. TREBILCOCK & DANIELS, supra note 3, at 31.
44. Id. at 63-65. The authors elaborated on the concept of accountability as follows:
For example, decisions of judges in lower courts are typically subject to a judicial appeal
process to higher courts. Gross dereliction of duty, abuse of office, and other flagrant
forms of judicial misconduct are typically subject to some form of judicial disciplinary
process, which may be administered by the courts themselves or by a semi-independent
body representing a diverse range of relevant stakeholders. Operational accountability in
the efficient and appropriate expenditure of public monies is often ensured through vari-
ous budgetary allocation processes and public audit mechanisms ....
Id. at 32. See also Stefan Voigt, The Economic Effects of Judicial Accountability-Some Prelimi-
nary Insights 3 (Int'l Centre for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19, 2005):
Of course, we do not want judges to be able to decide no matter what with regard to cases
brought before them. We want them to treat the parties appearing in front of them with
respect, to separate relevant from irrelevant arguments, and to decide the case within a
reasonable period of time according to the letter of the law. We do not want them to let
their personal preferences or their sympathy or antipathy with the parties to taint their de-
cision. In that sense, we want judges to be accountable to the law and, at the end of the
day, to the people who use the law as a means to structure their interactions.
45. TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 91.
46. Id. at 112; Erik G. Jensen, The Rule of Law and Judicial Reform: The Political Economy
of Diverse Institutional Patterns and Reformers' Responses, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE:
EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 336, 338 (Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds.,
Stanford Univ. Press 2003) ("In Western liberal democratic discourse, rule of law connotes a com-
mitment to democracy, an emphasis on law and order, limitations on the power of state action (par-
ticularly police and prosecutors), respect for legal authority, individual rights, and an effort to hold
state actors up to the same rules and standards as everyone else.") (footnote omitted).
47. See, e.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 122.
48. Id. at 123.
49. Id. at 126.
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Without specifying what the rules should be, the concept calls for gov-
ernment to "sublimate their views to the applicable laws."5°
Finally, the World Justice Project recently developed a Rule of Law
index that has been and will be applied to a number of countries, includ-
ing the United States, to measure the extent to which a country acts in
conformity with the rule of law.51 A pilot study performed for the Pro-
ject by the Vera Institute measured the rule of law to a limited extent in
three cities outside the United States and in New York City to "gauge the
extent to which all people, particularly those who are poor or otherwise
marginalized, experience and benefit from the rule of law. 52
50. Id. at 140.
51. World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index, http://www.worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-
law-index (last visited Nov. 4, 2008):
The Rule of Law Index is the first index that examines the rule of law comprehensively.
. . Because the Index looks at the rule of law in practice and not solely as it exists on the
books, the Index will be able to guide governments, civil society, NGOs and business
leaders in targeting efforts to strengthen the rule of law.
The WJP has developed a robust and cost-effective methodology to measure more than
100 variables. It utilizes two main sources of new data: a general population poll, and a
qualified respondent's questionnaire. In addition, existing data and data drawn from other
indices are being incorporated into the analysis.
The WJP has completed field testing Version 1.0 of the Rule of Law Index in Argentina,
Australia, Colombia, Spain, Sweden and the USA. The next round of testing will be
conducted in Liberia and Tanzania. The WJP anticipates administering the Index in 100
countries in three years. In each country where the Index is administered, the WJP will
prepare a Rule of Law Index report that describes its findings. The Index will be
administered periodically to show changes in countries over time.
See also MARK DAVID AGRAST ET AL., THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX:
MEASURING ADHERENCE TO THE RULE OF LAW AROUND THE WORLD 5, 8,22, 23 (2008); id. at 5:
The Index methodology employs a combination of data collection methods and sources
of information, including a standardized general population poll, four standardized expert
surveys, and analysis and triangulation of data from existing indices and local sources.
The methodology developed by the WJP [World Justice Project] team was tested in Ar-
gentina, Australia, Colombia, Spain, Sweden and the United States.
52. JIM PARSONS ET AL., VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, DEVELOPING INDICATORS TO
MEASURE THE RULE OF LAW: A GLOBAL APPROACH, A REPORT TO THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT 1
(2008). See also AGRAST, supra note 51, at 5 ("In addition, the Vera Institute of Justice developed
for the WJP a set of new performance indicators to measure the Index, and tested indicators for the
last two bands of the Index in [particular'cities in] Chile, India, Nigeria and the United States.").
The Vera project commenced in January 2008, and its findings were presented to the World Justice
Forum in Vienna, Austria, in July 2008. PARSONS, supra at 1. In addition to New York City, the
particular cities studied were Chandigarh, India, Lagos, Nigeria, and Santiago, Chile. Id. As a pilot
project, the Vera report also noted lessons learned, next steps, and future challenges. Id. at 23-26.
As its "baseline" definition of the rule of law, the Vera Report accepted a 2004 definition
of the United Nations Secretary-General, as follows:
[The "rule of law"] refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions
and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are
publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are
consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well,
measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the
law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers,
participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and proce-
dural and legal transparency.
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2. What is Economic Development?
Although the rule of law obviously applies to the United States as
well as other countries, the phrase is still most commonly used these
days in the field of international development work. 53  For example,
starting in the early 1990s, the World Bank and LMF "began conditioning
the provision of financial assistance on the implementation of the rule of
law in recipient countries," justified in order to "provide a secure envi-
ronment for investments, property, contracts, and market transactions.
54
Over the past couple of decades, this has grown to be a professional
field, whose practitioners use funding from international development
institutions, such as USAID, to promote the rule of law in developing
countries and post-conflict environments.55
Id. at 3 (citing the Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies, 4, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004.616) (August 23, 2004)
cited with approval in U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., THE GUIDE TO RULE OF LAW COUNTRY
ANALYSIS: THE RULE OF LAW STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 5 (2008)). This definition in part appears to
invoke the rule of good law by bringing in a human rights component to the rule of law and therefore
would fall within the "thicker" part of the scale for rule of law definitions. AGRAST, supra note 51,
at 6.
53. For application of the concept of the rule of law domestically, see TAMANAHA, supra note
29, at 130 (providing examples of how the United States has disregarded the rule of law in the inter-
national arena). See also Symposium, supra note 5, at 223-26; Marci Hamilton, The Rule of Law
Even As We Try to Export the Ideal of Justice By Law, Not Whim, Some in America Resist That Very
Ideal, (Oct. 23, 2003), available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20031023.html ("Public
servants... have invested enormous amounts of time into the project of exporting the rule of law to
countries trying to establish democracy .... Even as we export this precious principle, however,
there is evidence that it has lost ground here at home."); World Justice Project, Domestic Main-
streaming of the Rule of Law, supra note 5 ("The rule of law needs to be strengthened in the United
States as it does around the world. To promote that effort, a kickoff 'mainstreaming' meeting was
held in Washington, DC in February 2007. Now, state and local bar associations around the country
are designing state-level multidisciplinary outreach meetings that can identify multidisciplinary
partnerships for strengthening the rule of law at the state and local levels.").
54. TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 2.
55. The antecedents of the current "law and development" movement may be traced back to
unsuccessful efforts in the 1960s to reform international judicial systems and substantive laws. This
effort, sponsored by USAID, the Ford Foundation, and private American donors, ended unsuccess-
fully but was subsequently resumed in a different form in the 1990s. See Messick, Judicial Reform
and Economic Development, supra note 10, at 125 (1999); id. at 128-132 (describing rule of law aid
programs); see also Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship Between Law and
Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 895, 900 (2008) (describing, among
other things, the "first wave of law and development theorists that emerged in the 1960's"); David
M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law
and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1062, 1065. The "most significant
reason" for the early failure was reportedly the belief that United States legal institutions could be
"easily transplanted to developing countries." Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Develop-
ment, supra note 10, at 126. Before the 1990s resumption, U.S. aid providers "took an interest in
law-oriented aid, starting in Central America in the mid-1980's," concentrating on criminal justice.
THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE 163 (Camegie En-
dowment for Int'l Peace 1999).
Many resources are available on international development efforts and practices, includ-
ing http://www.bizclir.coml ("This site is a dynamic knowledge development and knowledge sharing
tool to improve the impact of USAID's efforts on Business Climate Legal and Institutional Reform.
The site will host information for development practitioners including: country assessments, best
practices, publications, and expert opinions.").
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Many articles refer to the rule of law and economic development;
however, little is said in those articles about the definition of economic
development, as if all readers knew what this term meant. Sometimes
the word "economic growth" is used instead of "economic develop-
ment," as if both words were the same; and sometimes the words "devel-
opment" and "growth" both appear in the same definition, as follows:
Outside the U.S., the concept of local economic development (LED)
refers to a broad set of financial and technical assistance provided to
less developed countries (LDCs) to reduce global poverty. In this
sense, policies and programs focus on a comprehensive approach to
economic growth that includes capacity building for citizen, public
and private sector participation and collaboration. These efforts may
focus on improvements to political, legal, financial, transportation,
communications, education, environmental, or healthcare systems.
Business or employment specific aspects of LED may focus on en-
trepreneurial development, foreign direct investment, and the devel-
opment and maintenance of efficient production and distribution sys-
tems for goods and services.
56
Although the subject is not free from doubt, development is some-
times perceived to be the broader term and more representative of per-
manent economic progress. Nonetheless, nothing precludes the rule of
law from supporting less extensive forms of economic progress.
56. Int'l Econ. Dev. Council, Economic Development White Paper, 1-2 (2006).
57. My wide-ranging inquiry in July and August 2008 about the meaning of "economic de-
velopment" to experienced thinkers in the field of rule of law and economic development surpris-
ingly led to responses to the effect that this was a "good question," with limited suggestions. This
led me to consider the subject carefully and reach my own conclusion regarding what economic
development meant, as stated in this article.
My similar inquiry about the differences between "economic development" and "eco-
nomic growth" in August 2008 led to numerous comments to the effect that this too was a "good
question" and suggested distinctions and theories on the similarities and differences. For example,
there were some responses to the effect that they are not the same; that they should not be applied
interchangeably; that development was a broader and more sustainable form of economic progress;
and that, among other things, growth may indeed occur (as measured by an increase in GDP) without
overall improvement in other indicators of economic progress, such as reductions in unemployment,
poverty and wealth disparity. See, e.g., e-mail from Moira Brennan to author and American Society
of International Law Interest Group Members for International Economic Law and Transitional
Justice and Rule of Law (Aug. 28, 2008, 22:05 EST) (on file with author and Denver University Law
Review). Among other things, the Brennan e-mail noted "thank you for raising an important ques-
tion . . .of whether the words 'economic growth' and 'economic development' should be used
interchangeably." Id.
Others commented to the effect that the phrases are often used interchangeably and are
essentially the same. See, e.g., e-mail from Frank Upham, Wilf Family Professor of Property Law,
New York University School of Law to author (Aug. 28, 2008, 09:13 EST) (on file with author and
Denver University Law Review) ("I generally think economic growth and economic development
denote the same phenomenon, i.e., an increase in the gross national product. The fundamental unit
of measurement is economic and does not include the political, social, or psychological measures of
well being that Sen was paramount in putting into the term 'development.' Of course we are using
these terms advisedly. Most people lump them all together."). See also e-mail from Kenneth Dam,
Max Pam Professor Emeritus of American & Foreign Law, Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago
Law School to author (Aug. 27, 2008, 17:32 EST) (on file with author and Denver University Law
Review) ("I believe that for most purposes they [i.e., economic growth and economic development]
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The definition of economic development may differ from country to
country and context to context, especially to the extent that it depends on
priorities. For example, for a country with insufficient housing, power
plants, highways, and jobs, it might mean more houses, power plants,
road construction, and new jobs. For a country with lots of housing,
power plants and roads, it might mean, among other things, more hospi-
tals and manufacturing, if those were deficient. If the country lacked
certain goods and services, development might mean the production of
those goods and services. The definition depends on what is needed in
each case.58  Furthermore, whether development in particular areas
should be left to market forces in laissez-faire economies or otherwise
directed or encouraged is a fair ground for discussion in a country-by-
country context.
As an alternative or supplemental tool for assessing economic de-
velopment, one might consider large measures of wealth, such as gross
domestic product or per capita income. To the extent that they do not
take into account disparities in wealth within a country, however, those
measures may be insufficiently meaningful. Therefore, to counterbal-
ance this, one might need to reflect on the "Gini coefficient of inequal-
ity." According to the World Bank, the Gini coefficient "is the most
commonly used measure of inequality. The coefficient varies between 0
[zero], which reflects complete equality, and 1 [one], which indicates
complete inequality (one person has all the income or consumption, all
others have none)." 59 "To begin to understand what life is like in a coun-
try-to know, for example, how many of its inhabitants are poor-it is
not enough to know that country's per capita income. The number of
poor people in a country and the average quality of life also depend on
how equally-or unequally-income is distributed. 6°
Thus one might not regard something which exacerbates wealth
disparities (e.g., by leaving virtually all the wealth in the hands of a few,
such as a dictator or an aristocracy, while the rest of the population re-
mains impoverished) to be positive economic development, even if it
are interchangeable today. But economic development does seem slightly broader in the sense best
seen if one looks at an oil rich country which may show rapid growth in GDP but by failing to build
the physical and other infrastructure for broader based growth in the future is not enjoying as much
economic development as another country which does prepare for continued growth after oil produc-
tion growth levels out or begins to fall.").
58. This definition of economic development does not define "needs." Nor does it specify if a
country needs many things how the priorities for filling those needs should be established. For
example, it does not answer the question of how many hospitals should be built if the country lacks
hospitals. This level of precision may be determined by the policymakers in each particular country.
59. The World Bank, Measuring Inequality,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITEEXTERNALJTOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/O,,contentMDK
:20238991-menuPK:492138-pagePK:148956-piPK:216618-theSitePK:430367,00.html (last vis-
ited October 29, 2008).
60. The World Bank Group, Beyond Economic Growth Student Book, Chapter 5, Income
Inequality, http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/beyond/global/chapter5.html (last visited
October 29, 2008).
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raises the country's overall wealth dramatically. Countries with extraor-
dinary disparities of wealth and poverty may also be unstable and thus be
poor investment climates for business. "High inequality threatens a
country's political stability because more people are dissatisfied with
their economic status, which makes it harder to reach political consensus
among population groups with higher and lower incomes. Political in-
stability increases the risks of investing in a country and so significantly
undermines its development potential .... ,,61
Regardless of the measure of economic development, certain prin-
ciples arguably support economic progress-namely, enforcement rather
than violation of legitimate bargains, 62 encouragement rather than dis-
couragement of investment in useful enterprises, creation rather than
dissipation of legitimate and useful employment opportunities, and in-
crease rather than shrinkage in the production of valuable goods and ser-
vices. The words "legitimate" and "useful" in this sentence are intended
to reflect the notion that there is no societal interest in enforcing corrupt
contracts or contracts otherwise against public policy, 63 creating unlawful
employment opportunities or ones which are not socially useful, or in
providing poor quality or undesirable goods and services. For example,
undesirable employment opportunities might be the following: jobs
building x when the country already makes too much x, and there is no
export market for x; or jobs in industries which do not benefit society,
such as building arms for aggressive war, serving in a dictator's secret
police, and engaging in narcotics production and human trafficking. The
armaments and narcotics themselves might also be examples of undesir-
able production.
The use of the phrase "public policy" brings up the question of
"whose public policy," since public policy may vary from country to
61. Id. See also id. at Chapter VI, Poverty and Hunger,
http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/beyond/global/chapter6.html ("A favorable investment
climate includes many factors that make investing in one country more profitable and less risky than
in another country. Political stability is one of the most important of these factors. Both domestic
and foreign investors are discouraged by the threat of political upheaval and by the prospect of a new
regime that might impose punitive taxes or expropriate capital assets.").
62. See KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 93 (The Brookings Institution 2006).
63. See Harry W. Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 143, 153
(1958) ("It is not that the right of property or the right to contract were ever absolute; ... the rule
that courts will not enforce contracts against public policy are sufficient reminders that every legal
system has put outside limits on the autonomy of property owners and contracting parties."). Nor is
the rule of law voided by certain contractual limitations. See also id. at 154:
[Sitatute barring forfeiture of premiums paid on a lapsed life-insurance policy diminishes
freedom of contract only in the doctrinaire sense that insurers no longer can impose for-
feiture clauses on a "take it or leave it" basis. Because of the inequality of bargaining
power, such clauses were never the subject of genuine negotiation between insurer and
insurance applicant. Similarly, it would be wildly unrealistic to see in a minimum wage
law only an interference with the individual employee's right to contract for less than
subsistence wages.
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country. 64 Western institutions attempting to bring rule of law reforms to
foreign countries would undoubtedly find it difficult to encourage en-
forcement which substantially offended their own public policy stan-
dards; and ignoring foreign standards of public policy would presumably
lead to resistance from the foreign nations concerned.
3. The Linkage Between the Rule of Law and Economic
Development
Many have linked the rule of law to economic development in de-
veloping countries, and statements to that effect are common and long-
standing.65 "The argument that the rule of law fosters economic devel-
opment has been made many times. ' 66 Although the principal focus of
64. See Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development, supra note 10, at 129 (noting
research on contracting in Africa and finding to the effect that "rigid compliance with the terms of a
written contract was difficult if not impossible, in developing countries. Their economies are simply
subject to too many exogenous shocks for contracts to be strictly enforced ....").
65. See Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development, supra note 10, at 121. The
article goes on to trace that argument to, among others, John Fortescue, Henry VI's chancellor, in the
15th century, Adam Smith in the 18th century, and Max Weber in the 19th century. Id. at 121-22. It
also links the notion to Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century. See id. at 3 ("Without a reliable judicial
system, he [Hobbes] argued, traders will be reluctant to enter into wealth-enhancing exchanges for
fear that their bargains will not be honored."). The full quote from Hobbes's LEVIATHAN is as
follows:
For he that performeth first has no assurance the other will perform after, because the
bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions,
without the fear of some coercive power; which in the condition of mere nature, where all
men are equal, and judges of the justness of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed.
And therefore he which performeth first does but betray himself to his enemy, contrary to
the right he can never abandon of defending his life and means of living.
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. XIV (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991), available
at http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviathan-c.html. The proof of Hobbes's
theory of transactions is difficult since it would require showing how many bargains were not made
because of a poor judicial system. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development, supra
note 10, at 120. A similar task would be to show how many dogs do not bark at night because of a
particular set of circumstances.
66. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development, supra note 10, at 121; see Posner,
supra note 26, at 3 ("If it is not possible to demonstrate as a matter of theory that a reasonably well-
functioning legal system is a necessary condition of a nation's prosperity, there is empirical evidence
showing that the rule of law does contribute to a nation's wealth and its rate of economic growth
[citation omitted].").
However, there is some controversy, among other things, concerning the strength of the
connection between rule of law and economic development in certain countries. See John K.M.
Ohnesorge, Developing Development Theory: Law and Development Orthodoxies and the Northeast
Asian Experience, 28 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 219, 256 (2008); see also Kevin E. Davis, What Can
the Rule of Law Variable Tell Us About Rule of Law Reforms?, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 141, 143 (2004)
("Optimistic claims about the role of legal institutions in achieving development have a long lineage.
In fact, most contemporary versions of this theory can be traced back to the tum-of-the-century
writings of Max Weber. But theoretical analyses that are skeptical about whether legal institutions
play an independent role in achieving development, or any other form of social change, are equally
easy to find.") (footnote omitted); David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance in the Ruins, 122 HARV. L. REV.
696, 696 (2008) (book review of CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND
CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD (2008)) (reviewer notes that authors of reviewed book de-
scribe themselves as caricaturing, "[i]n [their] more cynical moments," what they call the "endow-
ment perspective," to the effect that "good economic outcomes" result from "good law + good
enforcement.").
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the rule of law and economic development discussion is in the context of
international development, some American business organizations have
noted the relationship between law and American economic prosperity as
well.67 For example, one multinational company has recognized that
"the business community [has] a particular opportunity to help spread the
word that if countries want to grow economically, if they want to create
better futures for their people, if they want to build new jobs, the inde-
pendence of the judiciary in fact plays a critical role in economic devel-
opment."68  In addition, the United States Chamber of Commerce has
concluded as part of its "tort" or "civil justice" reform agenda that the
American tort system costs businesses billions and harms both employ-
ment and productivity.69 Similar statements have been made by others,
including the American Tort Reform Association:
67. Construed broadly, the civil justice reform agenda, to the extent that it seeks greater
fairness and even-handedness, is consistent with the rule of law. To the extent that the goal is not an
impartial system but one in which victory is assured or nearly assured in each case, it would not be.
See, e.g., JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (Doubleday 2008). Much of the reform language, however,
asserts the benefits of an unbiased and even-handed system, the proverbial "level playing field."
68. Text of prepared remarks by Brad Smith, Senior Vice President, Legal & Corporate Af-
fairs, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary, Microsoft Corporation, American Society of Inter-
national Law Second Century Dinner, Washington, D.C., November 3, 2006, available at
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/exec/bradsmith/l1-03-061ntemationalLaw.mspx (last visited
October 28, 2008). See also id. (emphasis added):
One of the things I first discovered when I was working in Central and Eastern Europe in
1990 and 1991, when the Iron Curtain had just fallen, was how enthusiastic people were
to welcome foreign investment, especially investment that they perceived as having real
potential to generate economic growth. That remains the case today. People want corpo-
rations to be subject to their laws and regulations, and quite rightly so, and they also want
them to be present and investing in the local economy. I think that one of the important
messages we have the opportunity and indeed do convey is that we're able to make those
kinds of investments only if we have confidence that there is a legal system with princi-
pled rules applied in an objective manner by an independent judiciary.
The remarks likewise commented on the importance of respect for a fair and independent
judiciary on a national level for respect for law at an international level:
The second challenge that I think we need to confront ... is the critical need for the
broadening and deepening recognition of the importance at the national level of a fair and
independent judiciary. You might ask "what does that have to do with international
law"? In answering, I would say this: one of the greatest threats to intemational law is
and has always been the prospect that executive power will simply ignore it. I don't
know how one can create a world in which executive power respects law at the interna-
tional level if executive power doesn't respect the independence of the law and the judi-
ciary at the national level.
Id.
69. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Institute for Law Reform, Lawsuit Abuse Impact,
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.org/index.php?option=com ilr-issues&issue-code=LAI&view=il
r issue&expand=l (last visited Jan. 5, 2009):
America's runaway legal system imposes burdensome costs on workers, consumers,
small businesses, and healthcare. The cost of America's lawsuit-happy culture totals $261
billion a year, or $880 per person, according to seminal research by Tillinghast-Towers
Perrin (2006). According to a 2007 study commissioned by the Institute for Legal Re-
form, small businesses alone pay $98 billion a year to cover the cost of America's tort
system-money that could be used to hire additional workers, expand productivity, and
improve employee benefits.
See also U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, Lawsuit Climate 2008: Ranking the States,
http://www.legalreforminthenews.com/2008PDFS/HarrisPollO8.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
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While most judges honor their commitment to be unbiased arbiters in
the pursuit of truth and justice, judges in Judicial Hellholes do not.
These few judges may simply favor local plaintiffs' lawyers and their
clients over defendant corporations. Some, in remarkable moments
of candor, have admitted their biases. More often, judges may, with
the best of intentions, make rulings for the sake of expediency or ef-
ficiency that have the effect of depriving a party of its right to a
proper defense. What Judicial Hellholes have in common is that they
systematically fail to adhere to core judicial tenets or principles of the
law. They have strayed from the mission of being places where le-
gitimate victims can seek compensation from those whose wrongful
acts caused their injuries .... Rulings in these Judicial Hellholes of-
ten have national implications because they involve parties from
across the country, can result in excessive awards that bankrupt
businesses and destroy jobs, and can leave a local judge to regulate
an entire industry.
70
The linkage between the rule of law and economic development
(including foreign investment) has been described as the "dominant the-
ory.,,
7 1
70. AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES-2007 1, http://www.atra.org
/reports/hellholes/report.pdf (emphasis added). Thus both the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the
American Tort Reform Association have identified the relationship between legal reform and the
economy. Nonetheless, to the extent that either group is identified with reforming judicial selection
methods as a cure, they appear to be divided on how to proceed. Both do support legislative meth-
ods of civil justice reform, however.
71. See Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Finding and Facing Facts About Legal Systems and Foreign
Direct Investment in South Asia, 23:4 LEGAL STUDIES 649, 651-52 (2003):
The dominant theory therefore proposes that foreign investors are attracted to states with
"effective" legal systems-that is, those which are efficient and predictable, imposing
relatively low transaction costs on investors; and that they avoid states with "ineffective"
legal systems-that is, those which are inefficient and unpredictable, imposing relatively
high transaction costs on investors.... The central focus of this paper is how this domi-
nant theory can be tested-that is, what methods can we use to test the extent to which
the effectiveness of legal systems affects success in attracting FDI [foreign development
investment]?
See also Dani Rodrik et al., Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and
Integration in Economic Development, 9 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 131-65, 157 (2004)
(noting the types of things that investors care about, including "the likelihood that investors will
retain the fruits of their investments, the chances that the state will expropriate them, or that the legal
system will protect their property rights .... Obviously, the presence of clear property rights for
investors is a key, if not the key, element in the institutional environment that shapes economic
performance. Our findings indicate that when investors believe their property rights are protected,
the economy ends up richer."). Foreign direct investment is not synonymous with economic devel-
opment; nonetheless, "[riecognizing that FDI can contribute to economic development, all govem-
ments want to attract it." Padma Mallampally & Karl P. Sauvant, Foreign Direct Investment in
Developing Countries, FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT, March 1999,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1999/03/mallampa.htm. See also id. at 3 ("Given the
potential role FDI can play in accelerating growth and economic transformation, developing coun-
tries are strongly interested in attracting it."). Some foreign direct investment can meet resistance
from the country which might otherwise receive it. See Daniel Bases, Global FDI to hit record
$1.47 trln in 2007-survey, Sept. 5, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/mergersNews/idUSNO518321220070905?pageNumber=-I (citing
"protectionist behavior including U.S. lawmakers resistance, cited for security reasons, to Dubai
Ports World owning six U.S. ports...").
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A set of common sense assumptions appears to underlie the connec-
tion between rule of law and economic development, with some limited
or questioned empirical study covering various possibilities,72 including a
73country's historical origins. These assumptions relate to the key com-
ponents of the rule of law. For example, "[m]ore independent judges are
often more efficient judges .... [T]he combination of judicial independ-
ence and efficiency seems to be essential for judicial reforms to have a
positive effect on economic development., 74 "Judicial independence is a
key determinant of growth as it promotes a stable investment environ-
ment., 75  Reforms which strengthen judicial accountability-and thus
efficiency-improve judicial performance.76  A sound judicial system
promotes economic development "[b]y enforcing property rights, check-
72. See Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development, supra note 10, at 122 ("Rigor-
ous econometric methods for verifying the rule-of-law hypothesis and the role played by the judicial
system are still in their infancy."); id. ("These studies also do not rule out competing explanations
such as increases in trade and investment or even the effects of other institutional reforms such as the
introduction of an independent central bank."); id. at 123 ("In sum, while history and comparative
analysis support the view that a better judicial system fosters economic growth, there is ... no clear,
empirical evidence showing the economic impact of a weak judicial system. The most that can be
said at the moment is that the weight of opinion and evidence suggests the existence of some type of
relationship."). In addition to judicial reforms, other contributors may exist, including a free press or
other free media, civic education, and an independent business community. See, e.g., Davis &
Trebilcock, supra note 55, at 910 (referencing body of literature connecting a free press "independ-
ent of government influence" as well as a "competitive press" with rule of law and development).
73. Some have proposed "the legal origins approach, as applied to economic development...
[which attempts] to show that the origin-say, English common law or French civil law--of a par-
ticular country's law is associated with that country's rate of economic growth." DAM, supra note
62, at 31. Using this legal origins approach, "[t]he central inquiry is to determine which legal fami-
lies have the best substantive law for financial development, using substantive legal criteria deter-
mined by the authors." DAM, supra note 62, at 38 (for a detailed discussion of the "legal origins"
approach, see id. at 26-55). Dam finds the approach "interesting from a scholarly point of view," but
of "dubious relevance" for "public policy formation for the poorer developing countries." Id. at 54.
See Kevin E. Davis, What Can the Rule of Law Variable Tell Us About Rule of Law Reforms?, 26
MICH. J. INT'L L. 141, 160 (2004) ("Even if one accepts the notion that these studies succeed in
demonstrating a connection between legal heritage and development, the studies are of little direct
use to prospective legal reformers, simply because a society's legal heritage cannot be changed.")
(footnotes omitted). Cf Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An
Empirical Investigation, 91 THE AM. ECON. REV. 1369, 1395 (2001) (the nature of a country's
"colonial experience" is "one of the many factors affecting [its] institutions."; the colonial experi-
ence varied, among other things, depending on whether the colonizers "settled in the colonies and set
up institutions that enforced the rule of law and encouraged investment[]" or "set up extractive states
with the intention of transferring resources rapidly to the metropole[]"; however, according to the
authors, these "findings do not imply that institutions today are predetermined by colonial policies
and cannot be changed.").
74. Botero et al., supra note 26, at 80; see also Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, Economic
Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross-Country Evidence Using A New Set of Indicators, EUR. J.
POL. ECON. 497 (2003) (correlating de facto judicial independence with economic growth); USAID,
The Guide to Rule of Law Country Analysis: The Rule of Law Strategic Framework 6 (Aug. 2008),
available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf-docs/PNADM700.pdf:
Rule of law provides a stable basis for democracy to develop. It ensures the protection of
those rights critical to maintaining an orderly and productive society, creating the condi-
tions that enable a democratic society to develop and thrive .... Such rights are also es-
sential to ensuring economic development and addressing poverty.
75. Millennium Challenge Corporation: Guide to the MCC Indicators and the Selection Proc-
ess: Fiscal Year 2008, http://www.mca.gov/documents/mcc-fy08-guidetoindicatorsandtheselection
process.pdf.
76. Botero et al., supra note 26, at 81.
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ing abuses of government power, and otherwise upholding the rule of
law and in enabling exchanges between private parties., 77 "[T]he claim
that judicial independence is a necessary condition for the protection of
property rights or economic growth should give any American political
,,78scientist pause.
"No one, whether local or foreign, wants to invest in a country that
is politically unstable or where there is no confidence in the justice sys-
tem, as investors would not be assured of a fair return on their invest-
ment., 79  "An independent judiciary could thus also be interpreted as a
device to turn promises-e.g., to respect property rights and abstain from
expropriation-into credible commitments. If it functions like this, citi-
zens will develop a longer time horizon, which will lead to more invest-
ment in physical capital. . . .All these arguments imply that [judicial
independence] is expected to be conducive to economic growth. 8°
"The link between property rights, the integrity of contract, and
economic growth comes through several channels, but incentives play a
central role: The more well-developed and secure are property rights, the
greater incentives individuals have to invest.,
81
Thus "the [World Bank] sees law as facilitating market transactions
by defining property rights, guaranteeing the enforcement of contracts,
and maintaining law and order., 82  As a former president of the World
Bank noted:
Without the protection of human and property rights, and a compre-
hensive framework of laws, no equitable development is possible. A
77. Messick, Judicial Reform: The Why, the What, and the How, supra note 10, at 2 (citing
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN); see also Perry-Kessaris, supra note 71, at 650 (footnote omitted)
noting:
[Clommentators and development agencies argue ever more regularly that FDI [foreign
direct investment] flows are to some extent determined by the effectiveness of host state
legal systems-that is, the institutions and officials involved in the creation and imple-
mentation of law, including courts and judges; bureaucrats; and politicians, in their ca-
pacity as makers and implementers of law.
Her article proposes the type of data which she contends is necessary to prove this argument and the
extent of its availability.
78. Haggard et al., supra note 27, at 217. The article also notes that "[mlost legal scholars
believe that appointment of judges is more likely to guarantee independence than election, which
requires a campaign for votes, organized interest group support, and campaign contributions." Id. at
216 (footnote omitted). This subject is discussed in more detail below.
79. Rugege, supra note 3, at 4; see also Kleinfeld, supra note 10, at 61 ("An investor does not
read the constitution of an emerging market economy but asks other businesspeople whether con-
tracts are enforced fairly and predictably.").
80. Lars &Voigt, supra note 74, at 499. Judicial independence may act as a counterweight to
avoid "takings of property by the state" where the "government itself is a litigant" and "in purely
private disputes when one of the litigants is politically connected and the executive wants the court
to favor its ally." La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. ECONOMY 445, 446-7
(2004); see also DAM, supra note 62, at 93 ("One conclusion widely agreed upon, not just in the
economic literature but also among lawyers and legal scholars, is therefore that the judiciary is a
vital factor in the rule of law and more broadly in economic development.").
81. Haggard et al., supra note 27, at 207.
82. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development, supra note 10, at 127.
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government must ensure that it has an effective system of property,
contract, labor, bankruptcy, commercial codes, personal rights laws
and other elements of a comprehensive legal system that is effec-
tively, impartially and cleanly administered by a well-functioning,
impartial and honest judicial and legal system.
83
Another World Bank commentator stated that "the payoffs from a
successful [judicial] reform, in terms of economic growth and develop-
ment, more than justify the work involved.,, 84  "One conclusion widely
agreed upon, not just in the economic literature but also among lawyers
and legal scholars, is therefore that the judiciary is a vital factor in the
rule of law and more broadly in economic development.,
85
C. The Challenges to Promoting Economic Development through Rule of
Law
1. What to Do and Where to Start
Addressing rule of law reform and economic development in any
specific country presents particular challenges. "Specifying the optimal
set of judicial and legal institutions for any given country is a ... diffi-
cult and context-specific task.",86 "The question ... becomes one of se-
quencing: Where does one start?
' 87
As in the case of economic development, the answers may depend
on what the country needs. Obviously, if the country has undertrained
83. Ohnesorge, supra note 66, at 256 (quoting James D. Wolfensohn, A Proposal for a Com-
prehensive Development Framework (January 21, 1999)); see also Botero et al., supra note 26, at 79
(citing Wolfensohn to the same effect). Ohnesorge's article argues for a modified approach to law
and development theory which takes account of the Northeast Asian economic successes in Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan despite their "failure to conform to law and development theories." Ohne-
sorge, supra note 66, at 230-31. The article notes that "studying only a country that has a weak legal
system and a weak economy, such as Russia in the early to mid- 1990's, encourages the confusion of
correlation with causation." Id. at 226. Others have questioned in specific contexts how much
formal legal institutions have contributed to economic success, particularly in China. See Donald C.
Clarke et al., The Role of Law in China's Economic Development,
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=878672 (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
84. Messick, Judicial Reform: The Why, the What, and the How, supra note 10, at 9; see also
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, of the Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the 2003 Financial Markets Conference
of the Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta: Market Economies and Rule of Law (April 4, 2003),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/speeches/2003/20030404/default.htm ("Uncertainties that
stem from the arbitrary enforcement of the body of prevailing rules are reflected in higher risk and
cost of capital which, in turn, inhibit economic growth.").
85. DAM, supra note 62, at 93; see also Christopher Clague et al., Contract-Intensive Money:
Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance, 4 J. OF ECON. GROWTH 185,
207 (1999) (contending that "economic growth and investment significantly accelerate when gov-
ernments impartially protect and precisely define the rights of all participants in the economy.").
86. Matthew C. Stephenson, Judicial Reform in Developing Countries: Constraints and
Opportunities, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT EcONOMIcs 2007,
REGIONAL: BEYOND TRANSITION 311, 314 (Franqois Bourguignon & Boris Pleskovic eds., 2007).
87. Kleinfeld, supra note 10, at 50.
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judges, insufficient computer systems,88 and lack of courthouses, one
would have to look at those items. Other considerations in deciding on
reform include resource constraints, which make it important to prioritize
among reform projects: "[E]very dollar spent on judicial reform is a dol-
lar that cannot be spent on other public goods or put toward economi-
cally productive private investment,, 8 9 including public health.90  Re-
searchers and policymakers may assess the effectiveness of past reforms,
and if inadequate, they may wish to revise their future approach.9' Other
activities beyond legal and judicial reform might be needed to improve
,,92the rule of law. "Rule of law is an end-state, not a set of activities.
For instance, one may need to inquire whether "developing the judiciary
is sufficient to advance the rule of law or whether it is also important to
invest in improving political processes. 93 Establishing and reviewing
the effectiveness of rule of law programs is an ongoing process.
2. Assessing the Level of Causation
a. Recognizing Causation Controversies
Determining, as a social scientific or empirical matter, whether eco-
nomic development is caused or at least facilitated by rule of law reform
88. But see id. at 52 ("Reform programs that focus on providing computers to improve court
efficiency in the midst of a political autocracy, for example, seem rather like treating heartburn in a
patient suffering from cancer.").
89. Stephenson, supra note 86, at 314. See also id. at 315:
A similar resource constraint problem, and a similar set of hard choices, appears when we
think about how to allocate resources among different types of judicial reform projects..
. . [H]ow should priorities be set? Is it more important to train judges or to computerize
the case filing and tracking system? Is it more important to invest in fighting corruption
or in educating the poor about their legal rights? Does it make more sense to concentrate
resources on creating a few highly capable specialized tribunals-say, to deal with dis-
putes involving foreign investors or major business transactions--or to spread resources
more widely to improve the average local court?
See also Stephen Golub, A House Without a Foundation, in PROMOTING, supra note 10 at 105, 119
(questioning the value of the argument that judicial reform is a valuable "development priority" in
itself (even if not "a direct path to poverty reduction") in light of the need to set priorities, noting that
resources are limited and there are other options "for serving the poor" besides improving judiciar-
ies).
90. See Kevin E. Davis & Michael B. Kruse, Taking the Measure of Law: The Case of the
Doing Business Project, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1095, 1116 (2007):
Given the limited empirical support for the claim that reforms recommended by the DB
project [i.e., the World Bank's Doing Business Project] will have positive effects on de-
velopment outcomes, it is far from clear to us that widespread implementation of those
reforms is an accomplishment worth boasting about. We believe that it is an open ques-
tion whether the energy and resources invested in legal reforms would have been better
put to other uses, including medical research, vaccines, distribution of mosquito nets, and
sanitation projects.
91. See Channell, supra note 28, at 145.
92. USAID, supra note 74, at 19; see also Kleinfeld, supra note 10, at 34 ("Current defini-
tions of the rule of law used by organizations working to create it abroad tend toward ad hoc laundry
lists of institutions to reform .... ); id. at 57 (objecting to "defining the rule of law by institutional
reform rather than by end goals."); id. at 56-57 ("Rule of law reformers believe, by definition, that
they are trying to create the rule of law.... Any work to reform laws, any change to police policy,
is considered rule of law reform.").
93. USAID, supra note 74, at 19.
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or any of its aspects, including sound judicial institutions, is beyond the
scope of this article. Such an approach requires an adequately designed
research study, perhaps on a country by country basis, controlling for the
effect of perhaps many other circumstances that might affect develop-
ment.94  One commentator, for instance, has identified the questions she
would like answered in order to determine the extent to which foreign
investment is influenced by legal reform, but noted that the data was so
far unavailable.95 The questions are as follows:
* Did or will you investigate Country X's legal system before you
deciding [sic] to invest there? (Are legal systems a factor?)
e If yes, did or do you consider it to be an attractive legal system?
(What is an attractive legal system?)
o Would you refuse to invest in, or remove investment from, Coun-
try X if you did not consider its legal system to be effective? (How
much of a factor are legal systems?)
e How much importance do you place on the legal system as a fac-
tor in determining where you should invest? (How much of a factor
are legal systems?)
* Have you had or do you expect to have much interaction with the
legal system in Country X? (How much of a factor are legal sys-
tems?)
96
The results may be inconsistent from country to country; and re-
searchers or commentators may not achieve consensus because of dis-
putes over the variables selected, the presence or absence of data,97 the
94. The World Bank's Governance project gathers subjective measures of institutional quality
and groups them into six clusters--of which the rule of law is only one-in order to measure the
quality of governance in many countries. In addition to "rule of law," the clusters are "voice and
accountability," "political stability," "government effectiveness," "regulatory quality," and "control
of corruption." The Governance project concludes that there is a relationship between institutional
quality and its measure of development, "hence their conclusion that 'Governance Matters."' Davis
& Trebilcock, supra note 55, at 938. The Governance project is also described on the World Bank's
website. See World Bank, Governance Matters 2008: World Wide Governance Indicators, 1996-
2007, http:/linfo.worldbank.orglgovemancelwgi/index.asp; see also DAM, supra note 62, at 52-55;
Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and
Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2007 7-8, 11 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper
No. 4654, 2008) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=l 148386. The governance data is updated
annually, and a website is dedicated to the cross-country data on institutional quality. See
www.govindicators.org.
95. Perry-Kessaris, supra note 71, at 688.
96. Id. (describing the questions that she would like to have answered).
97. Davis & Kruse, supra note 90, at 1114 ("Given the often sweeping conclusions drawn by
the ... authors, it is clear that they want to draw inferences about the relationship of regulation to
development that go well beyond the limited set of regulations and social and economic outcomes
they have studied."). Compare Marcus J. Kurtz and Andrew Schrank, Growth and Governance:
Models, Measures, and Mechanisms, 69 J. POL. 538, 547, 552 (2007) (pointing out that "[riecent
scholarship has emphasized the importance of good governance for economic performance," yet
contending that "the oft-asserted connection between growth and governance lies on exceedingly
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definition of terms (including what is "rule of law" and what is "eco-
nomic development"),98 other methodological controversies, such as
countries that arguably do not fit within the overall theory, and the con-
tention that correlation between rule of law reform and economic devel-
opment is being confused with cause.99 Some even suggest that causa-
tion flows in reverse, with economic development leading to rule of law
reform, rather than rule of law reform leading to economic develop-
ment.1°° Causation may also flow in both directions.' 0 '
Moreover, certain northeast Asian countries have weak rule of law
and had substantial economic progress 10 2  Some may question, if this is
established, what this means for the general rule: for example, are they
outliers or anomalies which leave the rule intact; is it too early to tell
whether the progress is sustainable; 10 3 might past progress have been
shaky empirical pilings"), id. at 541 ("Clean, effective government is desirable, but what is not so
clear is whether it is an essential or even important antecedent of rapid economic growth..."), and
Marcus J. Kurtz and Andrew Schrank, Growth and Governance: A Defense, 69 J. POL. 563 (2007),
with Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, Growth and Governance: A Reply, J.
POL. 555, 555 (2007) (responding to Kurtz and Shrank articles, among other things, by noting that
there is a "rich body of recent work in the economics literature that has documented a sizeable long-
run effect of governance on growth."), and Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi,
Growth and Governance: A Rejoinder, 69 J. POL. 570 (2007) (further rebuttal to Kurtz and Shrank
articles).
98. Davis & Kruse, supra note 90, at 1097 (referring to the "complexity and uncertainty of
law, the contested nature of the concept of development, the opacity of the causal connection be-
tween these phenomena . .
99. Id. at 1112-13.
100. See Daniel M. Klerman, Legal Infrastructure, Judicial Independence, and Economic
Development, 19 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L. J. 427, 430 (2007) ("Although inde-
pendent courts are usually viewed as a cause of economic growth, the reverse may be true .... As
wealth increases, private parties have more to offer the government and become more politically
powerful. As a result, as economic growth occurs, demand for independent courts may increase and
such demands are more likely to be heeded."). Nonetheless, despite acknowledging the reverse
causation argument, Klerman also acknowledges that independent courts promote growth, noting
that "economic theory suggests that effective, independent courts promote investment and economic
growth.... The empirical literature provides some support for the idea that independent courts
encourage economic growth, but causation remains unclear and much work remains to be done." Id.
at 434.
101. DAM, supra note 62, at 276 ("The econometric evidence examined in earlier chapters
showing that causation runs from institutions to growth rather than vice versa may be interpreted to
say that on balance the causation runs from institutions to growth but that to some extent increasing
wealth helps to build institutions.").
102. See Ohnesorge, supra note 66, at 258-60 (2007). Others point out that in some situations
the rule of law may be weak and foreign investment may be strong or that foreign investment may
not even be required for economic development. See, e.g., Carothers, Steps Toward Knowledge, in
PROMOTING, supra note 10, at 17. For policymakers, unquestioned social scientific proof of the
connection between the rule of law and economic development may be unnecessary or at least only
be a long-term objective; and common sense may sometimes be enough for reasoned decision-
making.
Even in a country with "weak" rule of law, the rule of law need not be weak in every
aspect. For example, the rule of law may be weak in cases involving the government or the rich, but
not involving two ordinary citizens having a breach of contract case. Or it may be weak in criminal
law cases but not in family law cases.
103. See DAM, supra note 62, at 277 (China's experience is consistent with the view "that
considerable development is possible without strong legal institutions but sustainable growth to
higher per capita levels requires considerable development of legal institutions."). Dam noted that
"[i]t is certainly too early to accept the notion that recent Chinese experience is a counterexample to
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greater still in those countries if rule of law were stronger; or is substan-
tial future progress possible only with stronger rule of law?
Even some skeptical commentary, however, would not entirely
deny the connection between rule of law reform and economic develop-
ment, much less suggest that law reform efforts cease; rather, these
commentators suggest law reform efforts go forward.1t 4 For example,
questions about a World Bank study relating to the connection of law to
economic development nonetheless concluded with appreciation for the
work and suggestions for improvement, not cessation.105 Another com-mentator noted:
the need for a focus on institutions in the developing world and, indeed, for a rule of law in China
itself," and that "little thus far in the Chinese experience leads to the conclusion that rule-of-law
issues are not important in economic development." Id.
104. See, e.g., Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy, in PROMOTING,
supra note 10, at 101 (objecting to certain aspects of rule of law rhetoric, but noting that "I do not
intend to discourage legal reform or the borrowing of legal rules or institutions from other coun-
tries.").
Thomas Carothers singled out as one of the objects of his concern "an unusually strong
initial sense of certainty, often verging on hubris, about such [rule of law] work ...." Carothers,
Steps Toward Knowledge, in PROMOTING, supra note 10, at 329. He likewise has referred to the
"enthusiasm of many rule-of-law assistance providers who believe fervently in the centrality and
naturalness of the rule-of-law agenda" and "unrealistic expectations." Thomas Carothers, Rule of
Law Temptations 18 (Oct. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author and Denver Univer-
sity Law Review) (earlier Preliminary Draft, Prepared for World Justice Forum available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/20080806033651 large.pdf). See also id. at 2:
The rule-of-law field continues to radiate an almost constant sense of discovery. Policy
actors and aid practitioners continue discovering it and becoming seized with enthusiasm
for the rule of law. They are often surprised to learn that what seems to them a vital dis-
covery is in fact a relatively late arrival to a revival that has been going on for quite some
time.
See also Carothers, Steps Toward Knowledge, in PROMOTING, supra note 10, at 337 ("The subject
[of rule-of-law] commands strong interest in many quarters and continues to be invested with high
expectations.").
But Carothers nonetheless applauds the rule of law effort, stating "that something vital
and dynamic lies at the root of rule-of-law promotion, something that will continue to sustain com-
mitment and hope in such work despite the daunting complexities and conundrums that exist all
along the way." Id. at 337. See also Carothers, Rule of Law Temptations, supra at 7. In addition,
when it comes to the connection between the rule of law and economic development, Carothers
notes that it is "real" and "plausible":
This continued attention to rule-of-law development reflects the fact that the connections
of the rule of law to economic and political development, although perhaps not as
straightforward as some early enthusiasts presumed, are real. In the economic domain,
the simplistic idea that the rule of law automatically helps foster economic growth has
come under useful critical scrutiny. Yet at least some positive link appears plausible and
is enough to animate many aid practitioners.
Id. at 2. See also id. at 7 ("The rule-of-law agenda on the international policy stage is of tremendous
potential importance and value.").
105. See Davis & Kruse, supra note 90, at 1117 ("Assessed solely as a research project, the
[World Bank's 2004 Doing Business] project is extremely impressive in terms of the creativity of its
design, scale, and rigor. The criticisms set out above are not meant in any way to detract from our
overall appreciation of the data-collection exercise that the participants in the project have under-
taken and its contribution to the enterprise of understanding the relationship between law and devel-
opment. Our sense is that the limitations of the project reflect challenges inherent in achieving its
ambitious objectives.").
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It is hard to argue that an effective, efficient, and fair judicial system
is not a good thing or that a country will be better off without "an ef-
fective system of property, contracts, labor, bankruptcy, commercial
codes, personal rights and other elements of a comprehensive legal
system that are effectively, impartially, and cleanly administered by a
well-functioning, impartial and honest judicial and legal system," and
I will not attempt to do so.106
... I do not intend to discourage legal reform or the borrowing of le-
gal rules or institutions from other countries .... It would be foolish
and futile to argue against it, and it would mean arguing against
transnational legal learning. 1
07
Still others contend that "[w]hile there appears to be an increasingly
firm empirically grounded consensus that institutions are an important
determinant of economic development.., there is much less consensus
on which legal institutions are important .... ,,t8 In any event, although
doing a study as an academic or future policy matter is undoubtedly
worthwhile and may fall under the heading of "next steps" or "future
challenges," it is unnecessary for the purposes of this article. Nor, as
shown below, need it delay policymakers from making the decisions that
they need to make in light of what they already know.
b. Informal Legal Systems and Incentives
Some contend that formal legal systems are not the only systems
causally linked to economic development or are not essential for devel-
opment. Instead, they identify informal legal systems consisting of vari-
ous incentives which also help ensure that persons keep their promises:
for instance, the negative consequences of failing to maintain a good
reputation. 1°9 This, of course, does not prove that formal legal systems
are not linked to economic development, but rather suggests only that
other informal incentives may be at work too.
For example, "[a] vendor who is a member of a community is
unlikely to risk his reputation by failing to perform his obligations under
a contract. The result would be a loss of respect and a subsequent lack of
106. Upham, supra note 104, at 78.
107. Id.; see also Carothers, The Rule-of-Law Revival, in PROMOTING, supra note 10, at 7
("Although its wonderworking abilities have been exaggerated, the desirability of the rule of law is
clear. The question is where to start.").
108. Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 55, at 945. The authors noted that the reduced consensus
on the role of legal institutions in economic development is affected by "the existence of informal
substitutes, [questions concerning] what an optimal set of legal institutions might look like for any
given developing country, or for those developing countries lacking optimal legal institutions (how-
ever defined) what form a feasible and effective reform process might take and the respective roles
of 'insiders' and 'outsiders' in that process." Id.
109. See, e.g., Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development, supra note 10, at 129.
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business."110 In other words, a company which does not carry out the
first bargain may lose the opportunity to have a second bargain, because
the company's reputation was harmed. Alternatively, the company may
not lose the opportunity to do another deal, but it may lose the opportu-
nity to do so at a reasonable price. Thus the cost of credit or sales price
or any other cost indicators may escalate because of the perceived danger
of a breach or noncompliance. "A country that cannot establish to the
satisfaction of the contracting private party that the rule of law will en-
sure fair treatment can expect to pay more, perhaps much more, just to
cover the risk.""' 1
In developed legal systems, reputation likewise plays a role in en-
suring compliance, especially given the uncertainties involved in contract
enforcement even in those systems. The availability of an action for
breach of contract may be of limited benefit even in developed countries.
Even if one has a valid claim, recovery is not assured. For example, the
party in breach may assert defenses or counterclaims or be insolvent; a
lawsuit may be time-consuming, slow and expensive; and the judge or
jury may simply "get it wrong." In many ways, it is important to deal
with someone with a good reputation under any circumstances. Although
reputation is not referred to as law (a phrase generally restricted to for-
mal law), this does not make reputation any less effective as a persuasive
(if not coercive) force to ensure compliance.
Sometimes it will be uncertain which mechanisms (formal or infor-
mal) cause some to keep their bargains. Some may keep their bargains
because of reputational or informal legal systems, some may do so be-
cause of the formal legal system or threat of lawsuit, and others may do
so because of the mixture of the two. 112 It might be difficult to guess
which is the most efficacious as opposed to supporting both. 1 3 Further-
more, both systems may provide greater safety than one, resources per-
nitting. 1
4
110. Kevin J. Fandl, The Role of Informal Legal Institutions in Economic Development, 32
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1, 14 (2008).
111. DAM, supra note 62, at 126.
112. See e-mail from Richard E. Messick, Senior Public Sector Specialist, World Bank to
author (July 18, 2008, 10:01 a.m. EST) (on file with author and Denver University Law Review):
Consider the following two scenarios-i) Firms observe the terms of their contracts be-
cause they fear that if they don't the bad reputation they get will prevent them from doing
future business. 2) Firms observe the terms of their contracts because of the threat of law-
suits. Would you say the rule of law exists only in #2? What if some firms comply with
contracts because of #1, some because of #2, and some because of concerns about both
#1 &#2?
113. Id.
114. See Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development, supra note 10, at 129 (refer-
ring to the "incentive to maintain a good reputation."). See also Erik G. Jensen, Justice and the
Rule of Law, in BUILDING STATES TO BUILD PEACE 119, 121 (Charles Call & Vanessa Wyeth eds.,
2008), noting that informal institutions are less costly:
I am pragmatic. Formal institutions are expensive to build. Enforcement through formal
institutions is complex. Formal enforcement is also expensive. These realities ... lead to
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D. The Policymakers' Decisions
A tension exists in the field of law and development between poli-
cymakers and researchers. They have different timetables and different
knowledge requirements. Policymakers (including international finan-
cial institutions) and companies and their CEOs may (and will) act on the
basis of sound policy, logic and common sense. None of these factors
requires a demonstration of causation to a reasonable degree of social
scientific certainty. Nor will they insist on such a high level of proof
given their time constraints: if necessary decisions awaited the comple-
tion of time-consuming research, the time to act might have passed. De-
cisions may have to be made on the basis of scientifically imperfect, al-
though otherwise sound, information:
Policy decisions on economic development issues are being made
every day in every developing country and in bilateral and multilat-
eral agencies in the developed world as well. Economy policymak-
ing is necessarily carried out under conditions of uncertainty-
uncertainty about the facts and about underlying principles and
causes. So decisions about whether to change legal institutions and
substantive law will be taken-if only by inaction-in substantive
fields, such as land, equity markets, and credit markets as well as in
enforcement, including the role and nature of the judiciary. Since
policymakers know that institutions matter to economic development,
it would be foolish for them to assume that legal institutions-both
the rules of the game and law's organizations, especially the judici-
ary-do not matter.
115
That does not mean that research should not proceed and hypothe-
ses and dominant theories should not be tested. Common-sense princi-
ples include the concept that economic transactions may be unsafe where
there is no reliable legal system to enforce them, and foreign investment
is less likely where the chances of investment protection are uncertain.
116
The lack of reliable enforcement may make doing business risky and
complicate business planning; among other things, it may impede the
a very practical approach. Figure out what informal institutions are doing; which types of
disputes are handled reasonably well by informal institutions and which are not; and tai-
lor formal institution building to handle matters that are not being handled well by infor-
mal institutions yet are crucial to the strategic dependent variables or outcomes identified.
115. DAM, supra note 62, at 231; see also id., at 230 (describing the position that the law
matters for economic development, or, otherwise stated, that "institutions matter" for development
and "that, in particular, legal institutions matter."). According to Dam, "[p]roof of the correctness"
of the premise that law matters for development "would be an ... exercise.., more appropriate for
economists and perhaps other social scientists than for lawyers and policymakers."). Id. See also
Kleinfeld, supra note 10, at 64 ("The new field of rule-of-law reform did not emerge slowly... It
grew from action-action needed right away-as states tried to keep regions from falling into pov-
erty and anarchy ... ").
116. See DAM, supra note 62, at 94 ("Better courts reduce the risks firms face, and so increase
the firms' willingness to invest more.").
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formation of long-term or complex contracts or contracts involving large
sums:
From the standpoint of economic development, perhaps the most un-
fortunate consequence of the unreliability of court enforcement is
that it impedes the effective use of long-term and complex contracts.
... Today such contracts are essential in developing countries, espe-
cially for electric generating plants, ports, highways, and many other
infrastructure projects.'1
7
It may also discourage the formation of new business relationships
and lead to more conservative business practices overall. 18 Also, "[the
prospect that courts will resolve these disputes impartially if the contract-
ing parties cannot agree often leads to more reasonable bargaining posi-
tions and more prompt compromise." ' 19 The argument connecting judi-
cial reform and foreign investment has "undeniable common sense ap-
peal-investors will want predictability, security, and the like."' 2 °
In addition, although some countries reportedly have attracted busi-
nesses to invest in their economies despite a weak rule of law, the weak-
nesses still may have been a negative factor for businesses considering
whether to invest and may have deterred more investment. 121  Further-
more, even if weak rule of law may not deter investment in some circum-
stances, strong rule of law may positively encourage it; and investment
may have been greater if rule of law were stronger. No one would be
expected to argue that strong rule of law is a "negative" or that the rule
of law should be weakened or corruption increased in order to improve
the investment climate. 22 Also, no one can preclude the possibility that
117. Id. at 123.
118. See THE WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2004: UNDERSTANDING REGULATION 41
(2003) explaining:
In the absence of efficient courts, fewer transactions take place, and those transactions
involve only a small group of people linked through kinship, ethnic origin, and previous
dealings.
... Courts have four important functions. They encourage new business relationships,
because partners do not fear being cheated. They generate confidence in more complex
business transactions by clarifying threat points in the contract and enforcing such threats
in the event of default. They enable more sophisticated goods and services to be rendered
by encouraging asset-specific investments in their production. And they serve a social
objective by limiting injustice and securing social peace.... Companies that have little
or no access to courts must rely on other mechanisms, both formal and informal-such as
trade associations, social networks, credit bureaus, and private information channels-to
decide with whom to do business. Companies may also adopt conservative business
practices and deal only with repeat customers. Transactions are then structured to fore-
stall disputes. Whatever alternative is chosen, economic and social value may be lost.
119. DAM, supra note 62, at 123.
120. Carothers, The Problem of Knowledge, in PROMOTING, supra note 10, at 17.
121. See id. ("It is clear that what draws investors into China is the possibility of making
money either in the near or long term. Weak rule of law is perhaps one negative factor they weigh in
their decision of whether to invest, but it is by no means determinative.").
122. But see TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 120 (noting problems with rule of law in service of
an authoritarian regime).
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investment may occur even if rule of law is limited: some percentage of
companies may tolerate high transaction risks in exchange for high po-
tential gains or even successfully "navigate" corrupt systems through
bribery or other means. 123 However, that is not the optimal situation.
E. The Consequence of Rule of Law Failures or Violations
Rule of law failures may have important consequences. Unfair ju-
dicial decision-making may lead to adverse judgments which will dam-
age litigants and their families economically, harm shareholders, elimi-
nate jobs, and interfere with society's ability to create goods and ser-
vices. The causes of failure include lack of judicial independence (e.g.,
cases are not decided on the law and facts but as directed by another
branch of government or person or to favor campaign contributors or
123. See LINN HAMMERGREN, ENVISIONING REFORM: IMPROVING JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE IN
LATIN AMERICA 91 (2007):
There are also many less formal means for moving beyond the initial dispute and return-
ing to business as usual. A company, unlike an individual, can factor any additional costs
into its price structure-and this is what commonly happens to bribes, speed money, and
negotiated agreements. Businesses resolve their credit problems by recourse to supplier
credit (a euphemism for not paying your bills on time).
See also Russell Gold & David Crawford, U.S., Other Nations Step Up Bribery Battle, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 12, 2008, at B 1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 12211662448992491l .html ("A
global crackdown on companies that use bribery to advance their foreign business interests is rapidly
gathering steam . . . . 'U.S. companies that are paying bribes to foreign officials are undermining
government institutions around the world.... It is a huge destabilizing force."' (quoting Mark F.
Mendelsohn, Deputy Chief of the U.S. Justice Department's fraud section)); id. at B-6 ("Until 1999
in Germany and until 2000 in France, tax laws allowed bribes to be deducted from corporate taxes..
. ."); Marlise Simons, U.S. Enlists Rich Nations in Move to End Business Bribes, N.Y. TIMES, April
12, 1996, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE3D71039F931A25757COA960958260&sec=
&spon=&pagewanted=print:
[Tithe world's richest nations today took an important step to fight corruption in interna-
tional business dealings by agreeing that bribes paid to foreign officials, often listed as
commissions or fees, should no longer be tax deductible .... Today's decision by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, a club of industrial countries,
commits its 26 members to rewrite tax rules that have effectively encouraged the bribery
of foreign officials by making such payoffs tax deductible.
See also Siri Schubert & T. Christian Miller, At Siemens, Bribery Was Only a Line Item, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/worldbusiness/21siemens.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq
=siemens&st=cse.
The company [Siemens] turned to markets in less developed countries to compete, and
bribery became a reliable and ubiquitous sales technique .... Inside Siemens, bribes
were referred to as "NA"-a German abbreviation for the phrase "ntitzliche Aufwendun-
gen" which means "useful money." Siemens bribed wherever executives felt the money
was needed, paying off officials not only in countries known for government corruption,
like Nigeria, but also in countries with reputations for transparency, like Norway, accord-
ing to court records.
... "Bribery was Siemens's business model," said Uwe Dolata, the spokesman for the as-
sociation of federal criminal investigators in Germany. "Siemens had institutionalized
corruption."
. .. Siemens will pay more than $2.6 billion to clear its name: $1.6 billion in fines and
fees in Germany and the United States and more than $1 billion for internal investigations
and reforms.
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local voters); lack of accountability (judges are uneducated, inefficient,
or otherwise perform poorly); and even criminal conduct, such as corrup-
tion.124 As a commentator noted, the rule of law is particularly important
to developed societies, including their economies:
The relationship between the rule of law and liberal democracy is
profound. The rule of law makes possible individual rights, which
are at the core of democracy.... Basic elements of a modern market
economy such as property rights and contracts are founded on the
law and require competent third-party enforcement. Without the rule
of law, major economic institutions such as corporations, banks, and
labor unions would not function, and the government's many in-
volvements in the economy-regulatory mechanisms, tax systems,
customs structures, monetary policy, and the like-would be unfair,
inefficient, and opaque.125
Besides the economic consequences, such violations may also
threaten the legitimacy of the court system, dissuade people from using
the courts, and effectively deprive them of a fair place for the resolution
of their disputes.
II. AMERICAN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ARE OUR
PRINCIPLES AT HOME CONSISTENT WITH OUR PRINCIPLES ABROAD?
To casual observers, the epitome of the rule of law is the United
States, and the United States is a leading exponent of the new rule-of-law
orthodoxy. When we look closely at the U.S. legal system, however, we
find few of these characteristics .... 126
A dark shadow is falling, fairly or unfairly, upon the perceived in-
tegrity of judges in many states that elect judges. Justice has been char-
acterized as being "for sale." Impartiality and the judiciary's rule-of-
124. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Judicial independence and corruption, in TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 10, at 16; Greg Mayne, Judicial
integrity: the accountability gap and the Bangalore Principles, in TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 10, at 41.
125. Carothers, The Rule-of-Law Revival, in PROMOTING, supra note 10 at 4-5. The essay
describes its version of the rule of law using a relatively "thick" definition, including "political and
civil liberties," as follows:
The rule of law can be defined as a system in which the laws are public knowledge, are
clear in meaning, and apply equally to everyone. They enshrine and uphold the political
and civil liberties that have gained status as universal human rights over the last half-
century. In particular, anyone accused of a crime has the right to a fair, prompt hearing
and is presumed innocent until proved guilty. The central institutions of the legal system,
including courts, prosecutors, and police, are reasonably fair, competent, and efficient.
Judges are impartial and independent, not subject to political influence or manipulation.
Perhaps most important, the government is embedded in a comprehensive legal frame-
work, its officials accept that the law will be applied to their own conduct, and the gov-
ernment seeks to be law-abiding.
Id. at4.
126. Upham, supra note 104, at 83-84.
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law function are plainly threatened . . . [Clurrent thinking on how to
protect the impartiality of the judiciary is gravitating toward the use and
refinement of appointive methods of selection and related processes. 121
This section suggests that rule of law dialogue should enter the do-
mestic arena, that domestic reform advocacy should reflect rule of law
values, and that lessons learned internationally should be introduced into
reform in the United States.
21
In supporting the rule of law abroad, Americans are advocating
concepts of judicial reform that our judicial systems sometimes fail to
comply with at home. For example, although international rule of law
efforts stress judicial impartiality, independence and accountability,
many Americans tolerate judicial elections that do not adequately protect
these qualities.1 29  Some judicial elections seem to be efforts to achieve
the opposite: namely, a tilted or slanted judiciary accountable to interest
groups seeking to elect judges likely to decide cases "their way" or to
hold judges accountable to popular and party preferences.
1 30
In addition, the rule of law embodies the predictable application of
the laws to all because the rules are open, known, and equally applied.
But if the rules for decision depend on which side contributed or might
contribute to (or against) the judge's campaign, or on who votes locally,
the rules are no longer known or susceptible to equal application. In-
stead, they may shift-or appear to do so-from case to case according
to the varying identities of the parties, depending on whether they are
funders or potential funders, or where they vote.
127. Donald L. Burnett, Jr., A Cancer on the Republic: The Assault Upon Impartiality of State
Courts and the Challenge to Judicial Selection, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 265, 281-82 (2007).
128. Various terms come to mind to describe the difference in the approach at home as op-
posed to the approach abroad, including hypocrisy, inconsistency, or cognitive dissonance. None of
them is necessarily comprehensive or apt. For example, the same actor may not be involved in both
situations so it is difficult to attribute those concepts to a single actor. Thus the United States gov-
ernment or the World Bank may be supporting judicial reforms abroad but are not known to have
taken positions on state court judicial elections. Nonetheless, taking the United States as a whole or
as a single actor, which may or may not be fair, a pattern of at least inconsistency appears to be
arguable. See, e.g., Kleinfeld, supra note 10, at 53 ("[R]eformers open themselves to charges of
hypocrisy .... The highly political process of judicial choice in the United States would never be
permitted by reformers elsewhere."); id. at 52 ("Practitioners are often following an idealized blue-
print of their home system that ignores its own difficulties and flaws, such as the intense political
involvement in the picking of the U.S. judiciary or the corruption residing in some European judici-
aries.").
129. See Charles G. Geyh, Rethinking Judicial Elections, BILL OF PARTICULARS, Spring 2003,
at 5, available at http://alumni.indiana.edu/conpubs/archives/Law-sprO3-combined.pdf (last visited
Oct. 17, 2008) ("I have reached the conclusion that judicial elections are fundamentally incompatible
with judicial independence, and fundamentally incapable of adequately promoting judicial account-
ability. The time has come to rethink judicial elections, to the end of gradually phasing them out of
existence all together.").
130. See, e.g., Upham, supra note 104, at 83-84. See also id. ("The U.S. judiciary is perme-
ated by politics .... If they [i.e., judges] are not constantly aware of the effect of their important
rulings on the electorate and the party's leaders, they will not be reelected, and they will cease to be
judges.").
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A. The Rule of Law Concept Is Not Merely International: It Should Be
Applied to United States Institutions
The U.S. and U.S.-based or -supported international development
institutions have been looking at rule of law reforms, including judicial
reform, worldwide, sometimes country by country.1 31 They have spent
considerable time studying and assisting foreign states needing such re-
form.132  While these organizations are looking outward toward reform,
other organizations within the United States are addressing the need for
similar reforms in the United States, though rarely under the banner of
"the rule of law."'133 In the foreign context, rule of law reform is driven
by the need for economic stability and development, and, in some cases,
human rights. 134 In the United States context, however, the same princi-
ples should apply, with a similar effort, starting with a closer look at state
court judicial elections.
This is not to say that the words "rule of law" do not appear in the
domestic context. They do, occasionally. Rather, these words do not
appear to be commonly used in the same comprehensive sense domesti-
cally as they are abroad; sometimes they appear in passing; and they do
not appear often enough. 135 Notable exceptions include Justice Anthony
131. See Bryant G. Garth, Building Strong and Independent Judiciaries through the New Law
and Development: Behind the Paradox of Consensus Programs and Perpetually Disappointing
Results, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 383, 383 (2002).
132. See id. at 384-85.
133. There are many court reform organizations, both national and local; those with a national
focus include the National Center for State Courts, Justice at Stake, and the American Judicature
Society. The Sandra Day O'Connor Project on the State of the Judiciary at Georgetown University
Law Center has also had a substantial impact. See generally National Center for State Courts,
http://www.ncsconline.org/DAboutindex.htm; Justice at Stake Campaign,
http://faircourts.org/contentViewer.asp?breadcnimb=8,284; American Judicature Society,
http://www.ajs.org/ajs/ajs-about.asp; and Sandra Day O'Connor Project on the State of the Judici-
ary, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/judiciary/ (all sites in this footnote last visited Nov. 19, 2008).
134. The focus of this article is on the economic aspect of the rule of law, not the human rights
aspect. The need for judicial reform to ensure human rights is fundamental, even in the United
States. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding
Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 832-33
(1995); Norman L. Greene et al., Rethinking the Death Penalty: Can We Define Who Deserves
Death?, 24 PACE L. REV. 107, 115 n.33 (2002) (relating to the effect of judges' rulings in capital
cases on their ability to remain in office). See also Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519-20 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Arguably, the concepts of human rights and economic rights are linked to
the extent that both relate to having a decent living standard.
135. See David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLuM. L. REV. 265, 327-28
(2008) (commenting in passing on the problem of rule of law and judicial elections):
On account of recent changes to judicial elections making them more open and competi-
tive, elected state courts will indeed have better majoritarian credentials than ever before.
But for anyone whose vision of democracy incorporates robust protections for individu-
als, minorities and the rule of law, this does not mean that they will be more democratic.
...In the new era [of judicial elections], the connection between elected state courts and
the people grows ever more vigorous, but at a grave cost to other democratic and rule-of-
law values.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Symposium, supra note 5, at 225; Bright & Keenan, supra note 134,
at 785 ("A few rulings in highly publicized cases may become more important to a judge's survival
on the bench than qualifications, judicial temperament, management of the docket, or commitment to
the Constitution and the rule of law.") (emphasis added).
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Kennedy's observation in a recent concurrence that the aspirations of the
rule of law "may seem difficult to reconcile" with state court judicial
elections, 136 as well as the work of the World Justice Project.
137
Popular judicial elections are a peculiarly American custom. 38  Re-
search has not disclosed any concerted effort to encourage judicial elec-
tions as part of any international program to improve judiciaries in for-
eign countries. The opposite appears to be true, with judicial elections
simply left out of the sophisticated rule of law and reform dialogue di-
rected internationally. They are not part of the rule of law reform pack-
age. Thus it has been observed that the American Bar Association's
Rule of Law Initiative, in promoting the rule of law, does not encourage
the election ofjudges. 139 Instead, it considers judicial elections as
136. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 803 (2008) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Justice Anthony Kennedy, in his concurrence upholding the constitutionality of New
York's election of state court trial judges, used rule of law language to question state court judicial
elections. Although finding a rule of law violation was beyond the scope of his concurrence, Justice
Kennedy was evidently troubled by the possibility that judicial elections constitute rule of law viola-
tions, noting as follows:
When one considers that elections require candidates to conduct campaigns and to raise
funds in a system designed to allow for competition among interest groups and political
parties, the persisting question is whether that process is consistent with the perception
and the reality of judicial independence and judicial excellence. The rule of law, which is
a foundation of freedom, presupposes a functioning judiciary respected for its independ-
ence, its professional attainments, and the absolute probity of its judges. And it may seem
difficult to reconcile these aspirations with elections.
Id. Although not using rule of law language, Justice Stevens's concurrence suggested that the lower
court findings "lend support to the broader proposition that the very practice of electing judges is
unwise." Id. at 801 (Stevens, J., concurring).
137. See, e.g., World Justice Project, Domestic Mainstreaming of the Rule of Law, supra note
5.
138. Few other countries elect any judges, and even there, the practice is limited. See Adam
Liptak, Rendering Justice, With One Eye on Re-election, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2008, at Al
("Smaller Swiss cantons elect judges, and appointed justices on the Japanese Supreme Court must
sometimes face retention elections, though scholars there say those elections are a formality.");
Herbert M. Kritzer, Law as a Mere Continuation of Politics, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 423, 431 (2007)
("The United States is almost unique in its use of elections in the judicial selection and retention
process."). See also Posting of Walter Olson to PointofLaw.com, Judicial Elections: A Dissenting
View, http://www.pointoflaw.con/archives/2008/07/judicial-elections-a-dissentin.php (July 17,
2008, 1:25 EST) ("Again, business litigants widely regard the judicial process of most other ad-
vanced democracies-in Western Europe, Japan, Canada-as more predictable and rational than that
of state courts in the U.S. And again, in those other advanced democracies, elected judgeships are
virtually unknown, being widely seen as part and parcel of the distinctive 'American disease' of
law.").
139. E-mail from Simon R. Cont6, Director, Research & Program Development, American Bar
Association Rule of Law Initiative to author (July 16, 2008, 10:44 EST) (on file with author and
Denver University Law Review). Mr. Conte noted as follows:
I wanted to confirm that, consistent with the relevant international standards, ABA ROLl
[i.e., Rule of Law Initiative] does not encourage the election of judges. Judicial selection
is one of the most important factors analyzed in ROLl's Judicial Reform Index, which is
drawn from various international and regional standards, including the UN Basic Princi-
ples on the Independence of the Judiciary, Council of Europe Recommendation R(94)12
"On the Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges," the Universal Declaration on the
Independence of Justice, the Syracuse Draft Principles on the Independence of the Judici-
ary, and the International Bar Association Code of Minimum Standards of Judicial Inde-
pendence. All of these standards state a clear preference for judicial selection based on
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the method [of judicial selection] least likely to achieve [interna-
tional] standards [of merit, including professional qualifications, in-
tegrity, and independence], due to the politicization of the election
process, the conflict of interest arising from the need to fundraise and
campaign, and the risk that judges looking ahead to reelection might
be influenced by popular opinion.
140
"To the rest of the world... American adherence to judicial elec-
tions is as incomprehensible as our rejection of the metric system."'
' 4'
Notably, "[t]he rest of the world.., is stunned and amazed at what we
do, and vaguely aghast. They think the idea that judges with absolutely
no judge-specific educational training are running political campaigns is
both insane and characteristically American.' 4 2
B. State Court Judicial Elections-An Overview of Concerns
Insofar as all state judicial offices are filled through the electoral
process, every judicial officer in this state is subject to having to decide
the merits of a case that involves a party or attorney who contributed to
or supported, or, conversely, opposed his or her campaign for office. 1
43
merit, including professional qualifications, integrity, and independence. Electing judges
is the method least likely to achieve those standards, due to the politicization of the elec-
tion process, the conflict of interest arising from the need to fundraise and campaign, and
the risk that judges looking ahead to reelection might be influenced by popular opinion.
140. Id.; see also Kleinfeld, supra note 10, at 31 ("The highly political process of judicial
choice in the United States would never be permitted by reformers elsewhere."); id. at 53 ("Many
legal professionals in the developing world know that the rule of law is a goal toward which even
Western institutions are still evolving.").
141. Liptak, supra note 138 (quoting Hans A. Linde, a former justice of the Oregon Supreme
Court, at a 1988 symposium on judicial selection); see also e-mail from Donald Chisholm, then an
employee of USAID, to author (Aug. 18, 2008, 16:22:38 EST) (on file with author and Denver
University Law Review), stating as follows:
From 2004-2005, I was the Chief of Party for a USAID-financed Rule of Law project [in
Peru]. One of the project's chief counterparts was ... the Presiding Judge of the Anti-
Terrorism Chamber. [The judge] was an extremely sophisticated counterpart who had
traveled in the US as part of a Department of State-funded program and had good com-
parative knowledge about other legal systems .... We... delved into the subject of the
election of state judges in the US. He found it surprising that a country that preached the
doctrine of judicial independence in its work overseas would permit the election of state
court judges by voters.
See also e-mail from Erik Jensen, Co-Director, Rule of Law Program, Stanford Law School to
author (Sept. 5, 2008, 03:28 EST) (on file with author and Denver University Law Review) ("Even
with all of [the] shortcomings... [of the international rule of law industry,] however, I am not aware
of a single international rule of law project that has stooped to consider[] support for a system of
judicial elections. The inherent distorting effects of such a selection process are so obvious that it
does not pass the most minimal plausibility test.").
142. Liptak, supra note 138 (quoting Mitchel Lasser, a law professor at Cornell Law School).
Professor Lasser compared the American system of judicial selection to the "much more rigorous
French model, in which aspiring judges are subjected to a battery of tests and years at a special
school" where "'you have people who actually know what the hell they're doing .... They've spent
years in school taking practical and theoretical courses on how to be a judge. These are profession-
als."' Id.
143. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, 2008 WL 918444, at *21 (W. Va. July 28,
2008), (Benjamin, Acting C.J., concurring) (refusing to recuse himself from the hearing of the case),
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Still another objection to the judicial elections has to do with how
they are financed. They are usually financed, at least in the Midwest, by
contributions from practicing lawyers. The result is the same kind of
quasi-corruption that campaign financing generally produces. The peo-
ple who contribute heavily are doing so, at least in part, in order either
to obtain the kind of judge who will make their practice more successful
or a judge who will be inclined to favor them out of gratitude or hope for
future support. The combination of the financing and selection effects of
judicial elections is very bad. 144
1. Is Justice For Sale? The Dangers of "Cash in the Courtroom"
No citation is required to establish that the sale or apparent sale of
justice does not comply with the rule of law. But concerns arise short of
sales or apparent sales. According to USAID, "[i]f a judiciary cannot be
relied upon to decide cases impartially, according to the law, and not
based on external pressures and influences, its role is distorted and public
confidence in government is undermined."' 145 The United Nations Basic
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary provide that judges must
"decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in ac-
cordance with the law, without . . . improper influences, inducements,
[or] pressures . . . direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any rea-
son." 
14 6
There is increasing alarm from Sandra Day O'Connor and other
well-known reformers and reform organizations that our system of judi-
cial elections creates precisely the scenario in which money and the need
to be elected influence or appear to influence justice among elected state
court judiciaries. That is, rather than there being a rule of law, there is
cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3051 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2008) (No. 08-22). See Marcia Coyle, High Court
Review Sought on Judicial Recusals, NAT'L L.J. (Aug. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202423489061 (discussing Caperton and describing petition
for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court and background of contributions to judi-
cial campaigns in the case). See also Editorial, Too Generous, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008 ("Situa-
tions like the Massey Energy case create an unmistakable impression that justice is for sale."); Edito-
rial, Tainted Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/13/opinion/13thu3.html ("The justices would do a great deal to
protect essential fairness by making clear that outsize campaign expenditures trigger a duty of
recusal on the part of the beneficiaries."). On November 14, 2008, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and agreed to review the case. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350,
2008 WL 918444 (W. Va. July 28, 2008), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3051 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2008)
(No. 08-22); Marcia Coyle, Justices to hear recusal case of W.Va. high court judge, NAT'L L.J.
(Nov. 17, 2008), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202426044460
(free registration required).
144. Richard A. Posner, Judicial Autonomy in a Political Environment, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 6
(2006).
145. USAID OFFICE OF DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE, GUIDANCE FOR PROMOTING
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY 6 (Jan. 2002, revised ed.), available at
http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/democracy-and-govemancelpublications/pdfs/pnacm007.pdf.
146. Id. at app. A para. 2.
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the rule of the campaign contributor, not to mention the local voter.
47
As Justice Stephen Breyer noted, judicial "independence means you de-
cide according to the law and the facts. The law and the facts do not
include deciding according to campaign contributions.' 48  That is the
subject of this section.
Various groups (loosely called "special interests") have been exten-
sively funding judicial election campaigns intended to seat judges com-
mitted explicitly or implicitly to favor their particular interest group or
the group's objectives. These are not the only types of judicial elections,
but they are the most notorious. Other types include elections where
voters do not turn out to vote or do not know who the candidates are.
14 9
Alternatively, the candidates are hand-picked by political bosses or oth-
erwise unopposed, with the results then provided to the voters for ratifi-
cation.1
50
Seeking judges inclined to support one side or another in a dis-
pute-whether that side is a business or an individual plaintiff-may be
futile as well as damaging to the rule of law. This is self-evident if only
one category of party is involved in the case. For example, the election
of a "pro-business" judge has little meaning in the cases which are "busi-
ness-against-business" and no individual is involved. Conversely, the
election of a "pro-individual plaintiff" judge may be futile in cases where
individuals are suing each other and no business is involved. In still
other cases, both litigants may not be businesses or individuals, but in-
stead one party may be the government.
147. Gur-Arie & Wheeler, supra note 2, at 140. See also id. (providing the quote from Mira
Gur-Arie and Russell Wheeler introducing this article); Upham, supra note 104, at 84 ("Most state
judges are elected and serve for a term of years .... If they are not constantly aware of the effect of
their important rulings on the electorate and their party's leaders, they will not be reelected, and they
will cease to be judges.").
148. Frontline: Justice for Sale (1999) (PBS television interview of Stephen Breyer & Anthony
Kennedy), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/j ustice/interviews/supremo.html.
149. See, e.g., Norman L. Greene, Perspectives on Judicial Selection Reform: The Need to
Develop a Model Appointive Selection Plan for Judges in Light of Experience, 68 ALB. L. REV. 597,
601-02 (2005) ("Voters in New York, as elsewhere, generally do not even know who the candidates
for judge are, and they often do not vote for judicial candidates at all."); see also Geyh, supra note
129, at 6 ("[A]s much as 80 percent of the electorate typically does not vote in judicial elections ....
[A]s much as 80 percent of the public-including many who cast ballots in judicial elections-are
unfamiliar with and unable to identify the judicial candidates.").
Given the number of arguments, it "would be impractical (not to mention tedious) to
canvas[s]" all objections to judicial elections or rebuttals to those objections. David E. Pozen, The
Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 293 (2008). See also Norman L. Greene,
Appointive Selection of Judges, Limited-Jurisdiction Courts with Non-Lawyer Judiciaries, and
Judicial Independence, 43 CT. REVIEw 80, 80-83 (2007) (describing problems of judicial elections
and Fordham symposium on what makes a good appointive system)
150. See Norman L. Greene, What Makes A Good Appointive System for the Selection of State
Court Judges: The Vision of the Symposium, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 35, 41-47 (2007) (discussing
Second Circuit's decision in N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 462 F.3d 161 (2d Cir.
2006), rev'd 128 S.Ct. 791 (2008) and describing political-boss-controlled elections).
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In sum, fueling judicial races to elect a judge inclined to support one
category of litigant as against another is not only damaging to the rule of
law, but it is pointless in a number of circumstances.
To be fair, some special interest groups consider themselves victims
of a system in which opposing groups are seeking to slant the judiciary
and in order to prevent another interest group from obtaining a slanted
judiciary, they are waging a "defensive" effort to obtain a judiciary with
a different "slant."' 151  Still others involved in judicial elections might
believe that they are supporting candidates who are dedicated to classic
principles of impartiality, independence, and accountability; however, if
that is occurring, it is not making the news.
Judicial elections have drawn the negative attention of many com-
mentators, including, most notably, former United States Supreme Court
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. According to Justice O'Connor,
"[s]pecial interest appeals to emotion and policy preferences tempt voters
to join efforts to control the decisions of judges."'152 "No other nation in
the world does that [i.e., elects judges] . .. because they realize you're
not going to get fair and impartial judges that way."' 153 She added that
"[w]hat worries me is the manner in which politically motivated interest
groups are attempting to interfere with justice.' 54 Also, the spending of
large campaign sums endangers the legitimacy that the public accords to
court decisions, which has led Justice O'Connor to call for the elimina-
tion of judicial elections entirely:
When so much money goes into influencing the outcome of a judicial
election, it is hard to have faith that we are selecting judges who are
fair and impartial. If I could do one thing to solve this problem, it
would be to convince the states that select judges through partisan
elections-that is, when a Democrat and Republican run against one
another-to switch to merit selection instead.' 55
151. See Joanne Albertsen & Malia Reddick, Conference Considers Judicial Reform, 92
JUDICATURE 80 (Sept.-Oct. 2008) (reporting on a conference on the judiciary featuring, among
others, Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Stephen Breyer at Fordham Law School on Apr. 8, 2008;
a co-author of the JUDICATURE article, Malia Reddick, was a panelist at the conference; and the
author of this article in the Denver University Law Review was the organizer of the conference).
One panelist observed that the campaign contributions of businesses to judicial elections may be
attempts at "fighting bias with bias." Id. at 82. Although that may explain the reason that certain
businesses believe that they are contributing to judicial campaigns, that would not justify providing
slanted information to the public on judicial candidates, let alone false information, if that were
occurring. Id.
152. Sandra Day O'Connor, Justice for Sale: How Special-Interest Money Threatens the Integ-
rity of Our Courts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2007, at A25.
153. Liptak, supra note 138 (quoting Justice O'Connor at the conference on the judiciary at
Fordham Law School on Apr. 8, 2008; the reporter, Adam Liptak, was a panelist at the conference,
which, as noted above, the author of this article organized). See also Albertsen & Reddick, supra
note 151.
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As Justice O'Connor noted, "We put cash in the courtrooms, and
it's just wrong."' 156 A New York Times editorial referred to the "escalat-
ing millions that special interests are pouring into state judicial elections
in an effort to buy favorable rulings. ' 57 The Times added that "special
interests are finding that buying up judges likely to side with them in big-
dollar cases is a good investment-the real-life grist for John Grisham's
new fictional legal thriller, 'The Appeal."
158
Cash distorts the intended purpose of the American judiciary-
namely, to decide cases on the law and the facts, not on who the parties
are-and leads some to believe that justice is for sale. Justice O'Connor
echoed her positions in the Wall Street Journal, singling out, among oth-
ers, the State of Pennsylvania:
The final four candidates running for open seats on the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania raised more than $5.4 million combined in
2007, shattering fund-raising records in Pennsylvania judicial elec-
tions. 159
... Most of this money comes from special interest groups who be-
lieve that their contributions can help elect judges likely to rule in a
manner favorable to their causes. As interest-group spending rises,
public confidence in the judiciary declines. Nine out of 10 Pennsyl-
vanians regard judicial fund raising as evidence that justice is for
sale, and many judges agree. 160
Whether bias is a fact or only an appearance, the appearances are
not good. "Elections can be very expensive to win, and elected judges
may well be viewed by the public as being beholden to their support-
ers. '"  The potential for bias was highlighted in a recent New York
156. Dorothy Samuels, The Selling of the Judiciary: Campaign Cash "in the Courtroom",
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2008, at A22. See also Roy A. Schotland, Judicial elections in the United
States: is corruption an issue?, in TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT
2007, supra note 10, at 26 ("[A]buse would occur if the judge's performance on the bench were
affected by [campaign] contributions received, or hoped for.") (with the exception of Professor
Schotland's brief article in the Report, the focus of the Global Corruption Report is international).
157. Samuels, supra note 156.
158. Id. See also O'Connor, supra note 152, at A25; John Grisham, THE APPEAL (Doubleday
2008).
159. O'Connor, supra note 152.
160. Id.
161. J. Clifford Wallace, An Essay on Independence of the Judiciary: Independence From
What and Why, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 241, 243 (2001). See also id. (comparing federal to
state elected judiciary):
The method by which federal judges in the United States are selected, appointment by the
President and confirmation by the Senate, is an attempt to free federal judges from the
political pressures associated with elections. Elections can be very expensive to win, and
elected judges may well be viewed by the public as being beholden to their supporters.
The appointment and confirmation process, combined with the constitutional guarantee
of tenure during good behavior and a salary that will not be decreased, is the Constitu-
tion's effort both to ensure the independence of the federal judiciary in the face of politi-
cal pressures, and to assure the people that their disputes will be fairly settled by inde-
pendent and unbiased arbiters.
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Times study of the Ohio Supreme Court. In that study, the New York
Times "found that [Ohio Supreme Court] justices routinely sat on cases
after receiving campaign contributions from the parties involved or from
groups that filed supporting briefs. On average, they voted in favor of
contributors 70 percent of the time."'
162
Elections could hardly be advocated, much less exported, to another
country. If judicial elections were occurring in foreign countries, some
of the same international organizations mentioned above would undoubt-
edly be concerned enough to target the country for rule of law reform.
The rule of law, however defined, encompasses impartial decision mak-
ing. It is therefore unlikely that any credible institution could validly
advocate in foreign nations a system that not only requires the raising
and expenditure of substantial sums, but which leads the public to be-
lieve that courts are deciding in favor of their campaign contributors, let
alone local voters. Instead of encouraging foreign investment in a par-
ticular country, this is the sort of enterprise that would cause contracting
parties to doubt that their bargains would be respected, especially the
party which (or who) did not contribute to the campaign, did not vote
locally, or even worse, contributed to the judge's opponent.
A Nigerian commentator grasped this point exactly in rejecting ju-
dicial elections for Nigeria on the grounds that elections fail sufficiently
to promote the concept of judicial independence as he defined it:
Those appointed to the bench because of their learning in law, their
experience at the bar and their moral character are likely to support
and defend the independence of the judiciary.... Accordingly, it is
not desirable that judges should be elected by the people, especially
where, in the absence of mutual tolerance, the constituent groups
have widely divergent, conflicting and irreconcilable interests.
63
The commentator told an anecdote about how a Louisiana Supreme
Court judge refused to meet him during his visit to New Orleans because
of a prejudiced electorate. The author noted that the judge informed him
that "such a meeting [with the Nigerian] would be odious to the elector-
ate, making his future election difficult."' 64
The Nigerian article may be dated in terms of its racial references,
and the author was a Senior Lecturer at the University of Nigeria at the
time it was written and perhaps not steeped in the tradition of American
judicial elections. Nor is this article cited to suggest that Nigeria or any
other developing nation enjoys a superior judicial selection system to the
162. Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court's Rulings, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006 at Al. See also Liptak, supra note 138; Geyh, supra note 129, at 6 ("80 percent
or more of the public perceives that when a judge is obligated to raise the monies needed to win
election or re-election, she is influenced by the campaign contributions she receives.").
163. D.L.O. Ewelukwa, The Independence of the Judiciary, 14 NIGERIAN BAR J. 38,48 (1977).
164. Id. at 48 n.25.
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United States. Indeed, one may readily conjure up worse selection sys-
tems, such as one that makes a judge's job virtually dependent on an-
other branch of government so that the judge could be effectively told
what to decide at the risk of losing her job. 165  Examples of this even
appear in United States history. 166 But the Nigerian article recognizes the
same problems with judges pandering to the voters that other modem
American commentators, including Justice O'Connor, have recognized.
The comments in the article are especially significant since they pre-
ceded the recent escalation of the costs of such elections, which may
make judicial candidates even more beholden to campaign contributors
and less likely to risk offending them.
Exportation of American judicial elections to foreign nations is a
fantasy. But the scenario is interesting to contemplate. It would un-
doubtedly result in different elections, consistent with local traditions and
means. For example, in some nations, it is difficult to imagine major
media campaigns. The types of campaign promises would undoubtedly
differ in light of local conditions; the candidates might be subject to dif-
ferent canons of ethics governing what they could say (if anything);
campaigning itself might be different as would be voter education (if
any); and millions of dollars might not be spent on campaigns, although
in relative terms the cost might still be expensive. Also, in some places,
recruitment of candidates might be difficult, since being a judge might
neither be well paid nor desirable; and it might also be dangerous.
The United States has some institutional counterweights and tradi-
tions, which some other nations might lack, that would reduce the chance
that an elected judiciary fully subject to the negative incentives to pan-
der, may veer off course. 167  (Conversely, the United States may lack
165. A modem example of this appears in Justice Stephen Breyer's description of "telephone
justice" in which Russian party bosses told the judges how to decide their cases:
I mean, years ago, we heard Russian judges-I did once at a conference-and they were
talking about what's called "telephone justice." And telephone justice is where the party
boss calls you up on the telephone and tells you how to decide the case. So they said,
Well, don't you have that in the United States? Now, really don't you? So I said, No.
And I looked around and I said, Well I know you're thinking that even if we did, I would
say no. They said, That's right. And I said, Well how can I explain it? It's just that no
one in the United States wants that kind of system and it would be outrageous and beyond
belief that someone would call up on the phone.
Frontline, supra note 148.
166. For example, "in the years immediately following the Revolution," state courts were
placed "very much under the thumb of state legislatures." F. Andrew Hanssen, Learning about
Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in the State Courts, 33 J. LEGAL STuD. 431, 441
(2004). Thus in Rhode Island, judges who "nullified a legislative act were called before the legisla-
tare to explain themselves and were replaced by the legislature when their terms expired the follow-
ing year." Id. "The substantial powers exercised by state legislatures over courts were largely the
result of two factors: the lack of a clearly distinct judicial role and an ingrained distrust of colonial
judges." Id. at 443.
167. For a discussion from an economist's standpoint of the workings of "negative incentives"
on judges see F. Andrew Hanssen, The Political Economy of Judicial Selection: Theory and Evi-
dence, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 413, 413-24 (2000). See, e.g., id. at 418 ("Are there groups today
that judges might be a little leery about displeasing? It depends on the institutional structure, and
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some of the counterweights that other developing countries might have to
substitute for an adequate judicial system, such as a well-developed body
of informal law.) 168  For instance, appointed courts, such as federal
courts, 169 are available for some cases, as well as alternative dispute reso-
lution. In still others, choice of forum clauses may allow parties to select
particular states for dispute resolution. 70 To observe that elected judici-
aries are sometimes avoidable, however, is hardly to compliment the
system that produces them.
Moreover, in some states, such as Indiana and New York, only
some or all lower court judges are elected, with appellate judges ap-
pointed, which permits correction, if necessary, by an appointed judici-
ary. 17 1 The opportunity for appellate correction should not be overstated.
whether that structure gives particular groups the means to affect a judge's career."). See also id. at
417:
[S]uppose that we are back in the days of King George II and that you are the colonial
judge. You serve at his pleasure, and here is how the system works: You render deci-
sions that he likes, you get a big house, a nice fancy carriage with fancy horses, a lot of
servants to wait on you. If you render a decision he doesn't like, he cuts your head off.
So that is the institutional structure: good decision, nice house and carriage; bad deci-
sion, no head.
168. See, e.g., Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development, supra note 10, at 129.
As noted previously, informal legal structures, such as reputation based systems, even if otherwise
adequate, might be inadequate for a number of transactions or the disputes arising from them, in-
cluding larger and more complex transactions. See Jensen, Justice and the Rule of Law, supra note
114, at 121; DAM, supra note 62, at 125.
169. Andrew J. Art, Sometimes It's OK to Just Go Ahead and Make A Federal Case Out Of It,
COLUMBUS BUS. FIRST (Aug. 24, 2007), available at http://www.cwslaw.com/CmsData/Site
/ModuleNews/SDM%20federal% 20case%20reprint.pdf (Ohio article observing that reason for
bringing cases to federal court includes the perceptions that "the system of electing state court judges
can give rise to the appearance of partiality, particularly when the defendant is from out of state" and
"that federal judges are less susceptible to local economic or political pressures."; note that state
judges are elected in Ohio). Certain state court decisions are also reviewable in federal court on due
process grounds. See e.g., State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (review of
punitive damages decision under the due process clause).
170. Alternative dispute resolution, such as arbitration, which is essentially consensual, would
have limited applicability in tort cases.
The use of alternate dispute resolution is, of course, not limited to domestic controversies.
International arbitration tribunals may also provide a method for limiting the negative impact of
certain foreign country court decisions. See Michael Trebilcock and Jing Leng, The Role of Formal
Contract Law and Enforcement in Economic Development, 92 VA. L. REv. 1517, 1541 (2006) ("In
contemporary international trade, three non-state institutions of contract enforcement are utilized
extensively to mitigate contracting problems arising from cross-border transactions" including
"international commercial arbitration .... International commercial arbitration has emerged over the
past two decades as a common mechanism for settling trade and investment disputes among private
parties in different countries."). But see id. at 1541 (2006) (referring to "some persistent forms of
contractual uncertainty relating to the limits of the enforceability of international arbitration awards
within national borders.").
171. See American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States: Indiana,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicialselection/index.cfm?state=IN (last visited Oct. 17, 2008);
American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States: New York,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicialselection/index.cfm?state=NY (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
The preferred method is commission-based appointment, and variations exist even among those
systems. For model provisions for such a system, see generally Norman L. Greene, The Judicial
Independence Through Fair Appointments Act, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 13 (2007). The American
Judicature Society has recently published some of its own model provisions for judicial selection.
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For example, in some states, including New York, the highest court is a
certiorari court, with no automatic right to appeal to that court in most
cases. Furthermore, not every question is reviewable by appellate courts
de novo, and deference in various situations is typically given to certain
trial court decisions. Finally, in order to prevent enforcement of lower
court judgments pending appeal, a monetary judgment often must be
bonded; and appeals may be otherwise expensive.
172
Much is to be said for getting a fair and impartial decision in the
first instance; and the question remains why any state judicial system
should rely on counterweights, rather than have a good system at the
outset. 1
73
2. The "Other Problems": Lack of Screening and Voter Knowledge
of Candidates and Participation in Judicial Elections
Judicial competence has been made part of the rule of law dialogue
by the World Justice Project;1 74 and Justice Anthony Kennedy would add
a "functioning judiciary respected for its independence, its professional
attainments,"'' 75 as well as "neutrality," to that dialogue. 76 The concern
about elections is not only a concern about judges and candidates pander-
ing to the electorate or campaign contributors, or retaliation against op-
ponents. Judicial elections are not the most effective way to secure
highly qualified judges, and such a judiciary is essential to fair adjudica-
tion:
See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISIONS (2008 REVISION),
http://www.judicialselection .us/uploads/documents/MJSP..ptr_3962CC5301809.pdf.
172. The damage caused by unfair justice in the United States may also be softened in some
respects by the availability of insurance to bear or share the costs in some cases. But not every risk
is insurable, covered by insurance, or within policy limits; and although the insured may have some
of its losses covered by insurance, that coverage does not prevent the harm from falling upon the
insurance companies themselves. Thus insurance shifts the risk of substantial loss from one com-
pany to another, but loss is still present. Insurance companies may also attempt to recoup some of
their losses from the insured and perhaps others through imposing higher future insurance premiums
and to spread the risk of loss to other companies through reinsurance.
173. The lack of restriction on judicial campaign speech as a result of the Supreme Court's
decision in Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 786 (2002), and subsequent cases
also threatens a loss (or at least perception of loss) of judicial impartiality. Under the rulings of
these cases, judicial candidates may now announce their personal views on certain legal and political
issues, and within limits, may solicit funds for their campaigns.
174. See World Justice Project, supra note 41 (providing the World Justice Project's definition
of the Rule of Law).
175. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 128 S.Ct. 791, 803 (2008) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
176. Frontline, supra note 148. As Justice Kennedy noted:
We have certain constitutional principles that extend over time. Judges must be neutral in
order to protect those principles .... There's a rule of law, [and it is in] three parts. One:
the government is bound by the law. Two: all people are treated equally. And three:
there are certain enduring human rights that must be protected. There must be both the
perception and the reality that in defending these values, the judge is not affected by im-
proper influences or improper restraints. That's neutrality.
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Most of what courts do is opaque to people who are not lawyers. It is
completely unrealistic to think that the average voter will ever know
enough about judicial performance to be able to evaluate judicial
candidates intelligently. That is a decisive objection to Arizona or
any other state deciding to elect judges. In states like Wisconsin and
Indiana in my circuit, states that have partisan elections of state su-
preme court justices, the system is putting an unfair burden on the
voter of trying to figure out which candidates would be good
judges. 177
If judges are to be selected with the "utmost care," elections are the
wrong way to select them.178 This is not the same as saying elected
judges are more qualified than appointed judges or vice versa. The ques-
tion is which method used to select judges is better designed to focus on
the judge's qualifications. For example, judicial candidates for elections
need not undergo mandatory screening179 or evaluation to run for elec-
tion; and the only qualifications for office are that they have a law de-
gree, have a specified amount of time in practice (if required), and be
elected. These "qualifications" alone are insufficient. A judge requires
legal knowledge and ability, including the capability to understand and
apply the complexity of the law, a good judicial temperament, and rule of
law values. 80  Litigants spend substantial sums in preparing their cases
and rely on the courts properly to evaluate and understand their argu-
ments and experts. But legal ability and temperament are rarely mean-
ingfully discussed in an election campaign. The voters are generally
unaware of the specific judicial qualifications of the judicial aspirant181
177. Posner, supra note 144, at 5.
178. See TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 125.
179. New York has a limited amount of bar association screening, political party screening and
certain other voluntary screening known as Part 150 commissions. See generally 22 Rules of the
Chief Administrative Judge, Part 150, Independent Judicial Elections Qualification Commissions,
available at http://www.nycourts.gov/rules /chiefadmin/150.shtml (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
None of these screening procedures is mandatory or required to enable one to run for a judgeship,
and an unfavorable rating does not preclude election.
180. See TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 125:
[J]udges must be selected with the utmost care, not just focusing on their legal knowledge
and acumen, but with at least as much attention to their commitment to fidelity to the law
(not inclined to manipulate the law's latent indeterminacy), to their willingness to defer to
the proper authority for the making of law (accept legislative decisions even when the
judge disagrees), to their social background (to insure that judges are not unrepresentative
of the community), to their qualities of honesty and integrity (to remain unbiased and not
succumb to corruption), to their good temper and reasonable demeanor (to insure civil-
ity), and to their demonstrated capacity for wisdom.
181. The voters may know the judge's educational background and years of judicial or related
experience. But these factors may or may not relate to the judge's legal skills or temperament which
may be better identified through a screening process which reviews the judge's performance in
detail. This process, most commonly used in connection with retention elections in appointive
systems, such as in Colorado, is known as judicial performance review or evaluation. In Colorado,
judges are initially appointed to the bench through a commission-based system; the only judicial
election is a retention election for a judge whose term is expiring; and in that election, judges are
unopposed. See, e.g., INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., SHARED
EXPECTATIONS: JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN CONTEXT (2006), http://www.du.edulegalinstitute/
publications2006.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2008) (considering various types of judicial performance
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and as previously noted, what judges do is generally "opaque" to the
public. 182 Moreover, American judges do not receive pre-judicial educa-
tion before ascending to the bench, and they either learn on the job or
through post-selection judicial education programs. 1
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Electing judges "means that people whom society wants to be exer-
cising a professional judgment, have to engage in a popularity contest
instead, and the most popular are unlikely to be the most professional."
1 84
Voters typically do not know enough about a judge's performance to
decide:
[I]f only a few people can identify the [judicial] candidates, and only
a few people vote, can elections really hold judges accountable in any
meaningful way?... [H]ow are voters supposed to assess the profes-
sional competence of judges? It is one thing to expect voters with no
training in the law to decide whether the policies favored by legisla-
tors and governors (who may not be lawyers themselves) coincide
with their own, and quite another to expect them to decide whether
the rulings of judges coincide with the law.1
85
Among other things, voters may be generally unable to assess a
judge's technical skills, including the judge's mastery of the rules of evi-
dence and the judge's ability to understand complex issues of substantive
law.' 86  Lacking useful information about judicial candidates, voters
sometimes vote "blind" based on cues having nothing to do with judicial
quality or perhaps upon the basis of the last political sign or other politi-
cal advertisement (regardless of its accuracy) that they observed; many
do not vote at all. 87  "Without accurate and relevant knowledge about
review, including reports on particular judges made available to the public before retention elections
as voter education).
182. Posner, supra note 144, at 5.
183. See Gur-Arie & Wheeler, supra note 2, at 137; Marc T. Amy, Judiciary School: A Pro-
posal for a Pre-Judicial LL.M. Degree, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 130, 134 (2002) (recommending pre-
judicial education for U.S. judges).
184. Posner, supra note 144, at 6.
185. Geyh, supra note 129, at 7.
186. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Malignant Democracy: Core Fallacies Underlying Election of the
Judiciary, 4 NEV. L.J. 35, 44-45 (2003).
187. Id. at 51. See also Sarah Elizabeth Saucedo, Majority Rules Except in New Mexico:
Constitutional and Policy Concerns Raised by New Mexico's Supermajority Requirement for Judi-
cial Retention, 86 B.U. L. REV. 173, 217 (2006) (noting that in retention elections, most voters
abstain or "vote blind" because they have to make a "decision on which they have no basis for
judgment" (quoting Robert C. Luskin et al., How Minority Judges Fare in Retention Elections, 77
JUDICATURE 316, 318-19 (1994)); Karlan, supra note 3, at 1046 ("[V]oters [in judicial elections] are
likely to cast their ballots in ignorance; they often seem to support (or oppose) every incumbent, vote
a straight ticket without any knowledge of the relationship between party and judicial philosophy (if
there is one), or simply not vote at all.").
The problem of voters voting on the basis of false or deceptive political advertising in
judicial campaigns is a matter of concern. One notable example of such advertising was in the 2008
election campaign between Gableman and Butler for the Wisconsin Supreme Court. See Adam
Liptak, supra note 138, observing the following about the campaign:
The vote came after a bitter $5 million campaign in which a small-town trial judge [Ga-
bleman] with thin credentials ran a television advertisement falsely suggesting that the
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the specific judges at issue, voters are prone to base their decisions on
factors such as ethnicity, gender, name recognition, party affiliation, or
length of time on the bench. Even worse, without information to inform
their choices, a significant number of voters apparently cast a vote with-
out any rationale at all."'
188
only black justice on the state Supreme Court [Butler] had helped free a black rapist. The
challenger unseated the justice with 51 percent of the vote, and he will join the court in
August.
... Judge Gableman's campaign ran a television advertisement juxtaposing the images of
his opponent, Justice Louis B. Butler Jr., in judicial robes, with a photograph of Ruben
Lee Mitchell, who had raped an 11-year-old girl .... "Butler found a loophole," the ad-
vertisement said. "Mitchell went on to molest another child. Can Wisconsin families feel
safe with Louis Butler on the Supreme Court?"
Justice Butler had represented Mr. Mitchell as a lawyer 20 years before and had per-
suaded two appeals courts that his rape trial had been flawed. But the state Supreme
Court ruled that the error was harmless, and it did not release the defendant, as the adver-
tisement implied. Instead, Mr. Mitchell served out his full term and only then went on to
commit another crime.
[Former Justice Butler noted that] "people ought to be looking at judges' ability to ana-
lyze and interpret the law, their legal training, their experience level and, most impor-
tantly, their impartiality. []They should not be making decisions based on ads filled with
lies, deception, falsehood and race-baiting. The system is broken, and that robs the pub-
lic of their right to be informed."
Part of the section relating to the problems of judicial elections, particularly the lack of
voter knowledge, is taken from Norman L. Greene, Appointive Selection of Judges, Limited Jurisdic-
tion Courts with Non-Lawyer Judiciaries, and Judicial Independence, 43 CT. REVtEw 80 (2007).
188. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., SHARED EXPECTATIONS,
JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN CONTEXT 15 (2006) [hereinafter SHARED EXPECTATIONS] (footnotes
omitted) available at http://www.du.edulegalinstitute/form-shared-expect.html (registration re-
quired). See also id. at 3 ("As a consequence, voters tend to vote based on cues unrelated to a
judge's performance, such as ethnicity or party affiliation, where that information is available.").
The importance of a judicial candidate's name recognition was reaffirmed in the West
Virginia Supreme Court election of 2008, where an advertisement connecting the candidate's name
to "ketchup" was concededly helpful in the candidate's success. See Justin D. Anderson, "Ketchup"
spot left its mark on voters deciding Supreme Court race, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Nov. 7, 2008,
available at http://dailymail.com/News/statenews/200811070217:
It was a short, simple television ad, meant to familiarize voters with the candidate's un-
common last name. And it was arguably the cleverest and most entertaining ad of the
whole election season. [Menis] Ketchum believes it was that ad, and later a sequel, that
got him elected [in 2008] to one of two seats coming open on the [West Virginia] Su-
preme Court by a surprisingly wide margin. "I worked hard, I worked continuously,"
Ketchum said. "I never stopped. I met a lot of people. But I think the ketchup ad elected
me.
Party affiliation determined the results in 2008 trial court elections in Harris County,
Texas, where 22 out of 26 Republican judges were replaced by Democratic judges. See Mike Tol-
son, Sweep revises debate on election of judges: Straight-ticket ballots contributed to multiple de-
feats at the courthouse, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 8, 2008, available at
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpUfront/6102615.html (describing, among other things, the
Democratic sweeps or near sweeps in Dallas County in 2006 and in Harris County in 2008). Texas
Supreme Court Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson took the opportunity to comment on the uninformed
electorate in judicial elections:
This is a strange way to select those who guard our legal rights .... It is time to decide
whether partisan election is the best means to ensure judicial competence. It has become
clear that in judicial elections, the public (particularly in urban areas) cannot cast in-
formed votes due to the sheer number of candidates on the ballot.
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Also, the amount of money required to run a campaign and the po-
litical nature of the election process may discourage qualified candidates
from running. Would-be judges just may not want to go "through all of
that":
[E]lecting judges greatly narrows the field of selection. Most people
do not have the skills or personality to be a campaigning candidate.
Nor is there any correlation between the skills of a judge and the
skills of a political candidate. So we lose a lot of people who would
be excellent judges but would be total flops as political candidates.
And that is certainly bad.
189
In contrast, seeking a judgeship in an appointment system does not
entail the same costs as in an election system: all that is needed is filling
out an application and interviewing.1 90 The relative simplicity of the
process may encourage those qualified persons unlikely to excel in the
political arena to apply.
None of these considerations-lack of screening, disincentives to
run because of the need for political involvement, or lack of voter
knowledge and insight-pertains to a well-designed appointment system.
In such an appointment system, screening of the candidate according to
established criteria, including knowledge of the law and temperament, is
not only commonplace but required.' 91 Although adopting the federal
system of appointment is rarely suggested for the state courts (and the
federal system has its own flaws), federal judicial candidates typically
are screened by the senators who suggest them, the presidents who ap-
point them, and the senate which confirms them. While some may ques-
tion the suitability of certain appointment systems, what makes a good
appointive system was the subject of a recent symposium and could be
studied further.
192
189. Posner, supra note 144, at 6.
190. City of New York Mayor's Advisory Committee on the Judiciary, Judicial Application,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/acj/html/application/judicial-application.shtml (last visited October 27,
2008). Cf. Sharon E. Grubin & John M. Walker, Report of the Second Circuit Task Force on Gen-
der, Racial, and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 11, 56 (1997) (appointment
system for federal magistrate judge system.).
191. See, e.g., id. at 52-53 (federal bankruptcy court judges); Greene, supra note 171. But see
Stephanie K. Seymour, The Judicial Appointment Process: How Broken is It?, 39 TULSA L. REV.
691, 693-97 (2004) (overview of federal judicial appointment for federal district and circuit court
judges during various past administrations, focusing on problems with the system of appointment).
192. See Symposium on Rethinking Judicial Selection: A Critical Appraisal of Appointive
Selection for State Court Judges, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (2007). My model judicial appointment
legislation, which is part of the symposium, appears at Greene, supra note 171. Compare JOSHUA C.
HALL & RUSSELL S. SOBEL, IS THE 'MISSOURI PLAN' GOOD FOR MISSOURI? THE ECONOMICS OF
JUDICIAL SELECTION, SHOW-ME-INSTITUTE (May 21, 2008),
http://showmeinstitute.org/docLib/20080515-smi study_15.pdf. HALL & SOBEL overlooks this
symposium in its discussion on the supposedly little work done on the differences among appointive
systems. See id. at 9 ("While there has been a tremendous amount of research about the differences
between elected and appointed systems, there has been almost no empirical work about the differ-
ences among appointive systems."). Some defenses of judicial elections suggest that since appoint-
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This does not mean that elected judges are never highly qualified
and that appointed judges are always highly qualified. Furthermore,
"[t]he quality of the elective judiciary, or of any given elected judge,
does not validate the deficiencies of the election system. Good judges
can emerge from poor selection systems. Even a monarch, dictator, or a
political boss can be capable of selecting a good judge from time to time,
but that does not mean that we wish to have our judges selected by such
persons."'' 93 But it does suggest that the system for selecting judges by
election is not conducive to identifying the best qualified judges because
it does not require screening and depends on fund-raising or campaign-
ing, which have little to do with judicial ability.
This article is well aware of the difficulty in measuring quality and
applying the test of quality to each individual judge. 194 An empirical or
quantitative comparison would be a major undertaking. The study would
have to isolate agreed criteria of quality; the criteria would not only have
to be valid but measurable; and the study would need to take account of
the different types of elections and appointment systems. All appoint-
ment systems are not the same, and for a study to be useful, it would
have to include the precise system being studied; and that may or may
not be a system that is even in place in any given state.195 From a struc-
tural standpoint, however, all commission-based appointment systems
should involve screening of judicial aspirants, and that gives the system
an advantage over any electoral system, if the screening is properly
done. 196
ive systems may have problems, states should stay with the flawed elective systems that they have;
or they engage in rhetorical praise of the so-called benefits of the democratic electoral process used
to select judges. See. e.g., Norman L. Greene, Reflections on the Appointment and Election of State
Court Judges: A Response to Adumbrations on Judicial Campaign Speech and a Model for a Re-
sponse to Similar Advocacy Articles, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 601, 612-14, 622-23 (2007); cf Stempel,
supra note 186, at 44 (noting not every office needs to be elected in a democracy, and well-
functioning appointive systems may be substituted for elective systems).
193. Greene, supra note 149, at 954 n.26.
194. See Greene, supra note 192, at 613-14.
195. Id. Even if the appointment system were only a model and not yet in effect, the study
might evaluate whether such a model was conducive to selecting qualified judges. The issue is not
merely what results appointment systems have achieved in selecting qualified judges in the past but
what they may be designed to achieve in the future. By way of comparison, in order to evaluate the
likelihood of an appointive system achieving diversity, one might consider analyzing the extent to
which past comparable appointive systems have done so. But it is also necessary to consider how
appointment systems may be designed so as to maximize the chances of achieving diversity in the
future. See e.g., Leo M. Romero, Enhancing Diversity in an Appointive System of Selecting Judges,
34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 485 (2007); see also id. at 487 ("Ensuring diversity is most likely to occur
when the law establishing the appointive system, whether in a constitution or statute, includes lan-
guage that mandates consideration of diversity.").
196. The author acknowledges that many of our elected judges may be excellent judges and
that the criticism of the election system is not intended to be a criticism of any of those selected by
it. He trusts that this is obvious regardless whether the criticism of the election system is in this
article or coming from Justice O'Connor, who was both elected and appointed to the bench, herself.
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C. The Economic Consequences of Judicial Elections
Although research is ongoing, considerable international develop-
ment experience teaches that the presence of the rule of law is linked to
economic progress, and its failures to the reverse. Thus, if judicial elec-
tions are or lead to rule of law violations, economic setbacks may be
anticipated in the United States where they occur. 197 Litigants and poten-
tial litigants-business and non-business interest groups 98 and policy-
makers-may consider the evidence, and if the potential consequences
are unacceptable, consider how to respond.
The economic consequences of domestic rule of law violations may
appear in various ways. For example, if the judicial systems of some
states or municipalities are presumed to be unfair, few businesses may
wish to locate or sell there, unless, perhaps, the risk is worth it. That
hurts businesses by depriving them of potential profits, and it injures the
localities by depriving them of tax revenues, jobs, and otherwise avail-
able goods and services. In addition, foreign direct investment may be
discouraged in those localities. After all, based on international experi-
ence, it is questionable whether companies would wish to invest where
they could not rely on a judicial system which fairly judged and re-
spected contracts. t99 Foreign investment is desirable in the United States
197. Whether states with elected judiciaries are poorer than states with non-elective judiciaries
or whether they are poorer than they would otherwise be if they had commission-based appointed
judiciaries is beyond the scope of this article. Similarly outside the scope is determining if they are
poorer, the reason is the fact that the judges were elected and for no other reason.
HALL & SOBEL, supra note 192, considers some economic literature with an international
focus relating to legal systems and economic development, without extensive analysis of the subject
or discussion of the rule of law; however, it concludes that there is a "positive relationship between
legal quality and [economic] growth." Id. at 3. The authors contend that "[j]udicial independence is
critical to a well-functioning legal system, and the quality of a state's judicial system is an important
determinant of economic growth." Id. (footnote omitted). After taking "as given the existence of a
positive relationship between legal quality and growth," they note that "the interesting question here
is how judicial selection influences legal quality." Id.
198. These other interest groups would cover those historically called trial lawyers or plaintiffs
groups, although businesses may equally be plaintiffs as well as defendants. All Americans have a
stake in our economy and business, whether through stock ownership, pensions, jobs, bank accounts,
and other things too numerous to mention, See e.g., Paul Krugman, A Slow-Mo Meltdown, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/04/opinion
/04krugman.html?scp=1&sq=economic%20meltdown%20and%20veiy%20scary%20things&st=cse.
199. See DAM, supra note 62, at 94 ("Better courts reduce the risks finns face, and so increase
the firms 'willingness to invest more."') (citation to World Bank report omitted). The author ac-
knowledges the comments made by Sheila K. Davidson, General Counsel of New York Life; Mary
C. McQueen, President and CEO of the National Center for State Courts; and Thomas J. Sabatino,
General Counsel of Schering-Plough Corporation, all of whom were panelists at the conference
which the author organized at Fordham Law School on April 8, 2008 entitled Enhancing Judicial
Independence, Accountability, and Selection for the State Court Judiciary: A Program for Reform.
See Albertsen & Reddick, supra note 151, at 81-82 for an extensive account of the conference.
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Stephen Breyer also made remarks at the conference,
where four panels were presented on topics related to judicial reform. The conference was spon-
sored by the Sandra Day O'Connor Project on the State of the Judiciary
(www.law.georgetown.edu/judiciary) and many other organizations, including bar associations, law
schools, and court reform organizations. Press coverage or references to the conference included
Adam Liptak, supra note 138. Other press coverage included Dorothy Samuels, supra note 156;
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as well as internationally. 2° Company employees may even be disad-
vantaged if they have personal cases to bring before the courts, and an
unfair or otherwise substandard judiciary may make it difficult to attract
and maintain such employees. Such effects have been collectively rec-
ognized, as follows:
When entrepreneurs decide where to open a new business, expand
operations, or market a new product, they weigh the comparative
costs and benefits of different locations. The tax structure, education
level of local workers, transportation networks, technological capa-
bilities of area universities, and weather are all factors that are as-
sessed. Another factor is the state's legal system. Is it a secure legal
system that is fair and predictable? Does it protect private property
rights and render timely court decisions? If the answer is yes, the
state will attract entrepreneurs and capital, foster competition, and
experience faster economic growth as a result.
20 1
Dirk Olin, Judicial Reports: Judicial Abacus (April 9, 2008), http://www.judicialreports.com
/2008/04/judicial-abacus-print.html; and Maggie Barron, O'Connor & Breyer on Judicial Independ-
ence (April 9, 2008), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/archives/oconnorbreyer-
on-judicial-independence/.
This was the seventh conference sponsored by the Sandra Day O'Connor Project: three
were at Georgetown Law Center in 2006, 2007, and 2008, and three others were held in 2007 in
Dallas at Southern Methodist University's Dedman School of Law; Chicago at Loyola School of
Law; and Atlanta at Emory School of Law. The author of this article was a speaker at the Dallas
conference in 2007.
200. See Frank Lavin, Remarks of Frank Lavin Under Secretary of Commerce for International
Trade at the American Business Group of Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, (Mar. 12,
2007) (transcript available at
http://www.commerce.gov/opa/press/Secretary-Gutierrez/2007_Releases/March/03-12_07_Lavin_
UAESpch.pdf):
Perhaps alone among the major economies, the United States has not had a federal gov-
ernment program to attract or retain inward foreign investment. All other major world
economies have mechanisms such as investment boards and investment promotion activi-
ties to encourage FDI [i.e., foreign direct investment]... .I am pleased to inform you that
the U.S. Government last week launched the Invest in America initiative to facilitate for-
eign direct investment into the United States.
See also JAMES K. JACKSON, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (Aug. 15, 2008), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organizationl109490.pdf; U.S. Dept. of
State Fact Sheet, How Foreign Direct Investment Benefits the United States (March 13, 2006),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/63041.htm (among other things, considering the extent of
foreign direct investment in the United States).
201. LAWRENCE J. MCQUILLAN & HOVANNES ABRAMYAN, U.S. TORT LIABILITY INDEX: 2008
REPORT 53 (Pacific Research Inst. 2008). See also HALL & SOBEL, supra note 192 (relating quality
of courts to economic growth and finding higher quality courts in states using commission-based
appointments relying on the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Institute for Legal Reform's State Liabil-
ity Systems Ranking Study). Hall & Sobel noted:
Judicial independence is critical to a well-functioning legal system, and the quality of a
state's judicial system is an important determinant of economic growth. States with
highly regarded legal systems better protect and define property and contract rights, pro-
viding the proper foundation for entrepreneurial activity and economic growth. Bad
court systems, on the other hand, can impede economic development by creating uncer-
tainty, driving up the costs of doing business (such as liability insurance or worker com-
pensation), and infringing on the liberties that underpin a free and prosperous market
economy.
Id. at 3.
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Businesses may also be "more likely to incorporate in states with a
higher quality judicial system., 20 2  This likewise has economic conse-
quences.
Business litigants may or should accept the risk that the courts will
be impartial and they will sometimes lose. But no litigant would or
should have to accept the risk that it is likely to lose unfairly most if not
all the time.20 3 Fairness and impartiality add predictability to the dispute
resolution and corporate planning process. But judicial elections-as
rule of law violations-result in unpredictability. Roughly the same
facts may lead to different results in different jurisdictions for various
reasons, including the influence of cash and local electorates and varying
and inconsistent rules on judicial recusal under which judges who receive
campaign funds from a litigant may (or may not) disqualify themselves
from cases.2° It is a common concern that judges make or appear to
make decisions that are favored by their campaign contributors and local
electorates rather than based on the law and the facts; indeed, the danger
of state courts adhering to the whims of the local electorate is a concern
even apart from campaign contributions. All this interferes with the abil-
ity of businesses and others to plan their transactions and forecast risk.205
202. Marcel Kahan, The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or
Takeover Protection, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 340, 348-49, 363 (2006) (using the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce's 2001 State Liability Ranking Study as its indicator of state court quality). See also
Albertsen & Reddick, supra note 151, at 82 (panelist notes that "corporations, when they are consid-
ering branching out to other states, often take into account the reputation of the courts in these states
for fairly and reliably resolving disputes").
203. A study on how much business is not being done in a state because of an unfair judicial
system if properly conceived might be useful. Questions to be asked as part of that study might be
similar to those discussed earlier, such as whether a particular company or companies did or will
investigate a country's legal system before deciding whether or not to invest there. See discussion
supra Part I.C.2.a entitled Recognizing Causation Controversies (citing Perry-Kessaris, supra note
71, at 688). Designing such a study, however, is beyond the scope of this article. Furthermore,
policymakers undoubtedly need to make decisions in advance of such a study.
204. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, 2008 WL 918444, at *31-51 (W. Va.
July 28, 2008) (Benjamin, Acting C.J., concurring) (citing extensive authority to the effect that
campaign contributions from a party or his attorney do not mandate disqualification), cert. granted,
77 U.S.L.W. 3051 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2008) (No. 08-22); JAMES SAMPLE, DAVID POZEN & MICHAEL
YOUNG, FAIR COURTS: SETTING RECUSAL STANDARDS 18-20 (2008),
http:l/www.ajs.org/ethicslpdfs/Brennancenterrecusalreport.pdf. The American Bar Association's
Standing Commission on Judicial Independence has an ongoing project on judicial disqualification,
and a draft report for discussion purposes only is available; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
STANDING COMMITrEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION
PROJECT (Sept. 2008), http:llwww.abanet.orgljudindlpdf/JDP-
DRAFT_FORDISCUSSIONPURPOSES_9-08.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2008) (on file with
author and Denver University Law Review).
205. The combination of judicial elections and some other element of unfairness, such as the
absence of a right to appeal to a higher court from an adverse trial court judgment, may be a combus-
tible mixture. Yet that occurs in West Virginia where judges are elected, and the losing party has no
automatic right to any appeal from a judgment. In a recent case in West Virginia, the Governor
stepped in to petition the Supreme Court to review a multi-million dollar trial verdict so that the
losing party, DuPont, would have some appellate review. The prevailing party argued that the
procedure was fair despite no appeal and that the first and only decision was sufficient:
Attorney Brian Barr said ... trial Judge Thomas Bedell already reviewed the punitive
damages for propriety during and after trial. Had Bedell found the amount excessive or
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According to Justice Stephen Breyer, the public's loss of confidence in
the judiciary from the campaigning and fund-raising alone may have a
negative economic impact on business. °6
D. Some Observations on Judicial Selection Reform
1. Considering Judicial Election Reform
Reforming the state court judicial election process may involve
changing it as well as replacing it. Although various commentators sug-
gest such reforms if elimination of judicial elections is impractical in the
short term, some recognize that these are limited remedies for a flawed
207system. The types of change available for state court judicial elections
vary in potency and address various deficiencies in the election proc-
ess. 20 8 These include creating private campaign conduct committees to
discourage inappropriate activities;209 increasing the filing and disclosure
of campaign contributions; improving voter education on specific candi-
dates (such as through preparing and making voter guides widely avail-
able); lengthening judicial terms to reduce the number of elections; in-
creasing qualifications for judicial office (including using screening
committees, where possible); and instituting nonpartisan elections (which
is not recommended).21 0
Heightened recusal standards and public financing of campaigns
might reduce the incentive or need to contribute to judicial campaigns
unfounded, "The court could have taken the punitive damages away," Barr said. "The
whole idea that DuPont has not had a review at all is senseless," Barr added, accusing
DuPont of stalling. "All DuPont is trying to do right now is protect its money." Only
West Virginia and Virginia give their appeals courts complete discretion on whether to
hear most civil cases, the governor's brief argued. The rest grant the kind of automatic
appeals that West Virginia lacks.
Lawrence Messina, Manchin Seeks Review of Appeal in Du Pont Lawsuit, CHARLESTON GAZETTE,
July 3, 2008, available at http://www.wvgazette.com/News/200807020756. See also John O'Brien,
DuPont appeal accepted by W. Va. SC, THE WEST VIRGINIA RECORD, Sept. 25, 2008, available at
http://wvrecord.com/news/contentview.asp?c=215028.
206. Frontline, supra note 148. Justice Breyer noted:
It [i.e., raising money for judicial election campaigns and campaign advertisements] de-
means the process. We all know there are other countries where, for various reasons, the
public lacks confidence in the judiciary.. .And where those things have happened, I think
there have been bad results for the people who live in the country, not just for the judges,
not just for the lawyers, but for the ordinary man and woman who lives in the country.
There tends not to be a method of fairly resolving disputes. And that means that it's
harder to develop businesses. It's harder to just live an ordinary life in a fair way and it's
harder to protect liberty.
Id. (emphasis added).
207. See ABA COMM'N ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY 74-81
(2003), http://www.abanet.org/judind/jeopardy/pdf/report.pdf [hereinafter ABA COMM'N].
208. See id. at 70-86 (2003) (detailing various options for election reform).
209. See A] Cross & William H. Fortune, Kentucky 2006 Judicial Elections, 55 DRAKE L. REv.
637, 642-51 (2007) (describing, among other things, the Kentucky Judicial Campaign Conduct
Committee). See also id. at 651 ("While the [Kentucky Judicial Campaign Conduct Committee]
cannot claim a great impact on Kentucky's 2006 judicial elections, the authors of this article believe
that the committee played a positive role.").
210. See ABA COMM'N, supra note 207, 74-82.
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and therefore might do the most to eliminate cash from the courtroom. 211
The lack of knowledge of candidates by voters may be partly addressed
by voter education, such as voter guides, depending on the content and
accessibility of the guide to voters. 12 Although campaign conduct
committees may have some effect in counteracting unfair judicial cam-
paign conduct, the committees have no power to stop such conduct.
2 13
Screening of judicial candidates, whether by bar or governmental
committees, is limited and voluntary, and a poor rating does not bar a
candidate from running for election.2 14 Nonpartisan elections appear to
be a poor device, since without party labels, voter knowledge of candi-
dates will be further depleted, leaving the voters to rely on name recogni-
tion, demographic factors, or nothing at all on which to base their
choice.215
In sum, while limited election reform is available, it may not cure
the rule of law violations set forth in this article. Based upon interna-
tional learning in the rule of law field and domestic experience, whether
such reforms are sufficient is doubtful. Hazarding a clich6, one might
view this as rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic, or otherwise
stated, futile.
211. See generally SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 204 ("[Cjurrent recusal doctrine makes it ex-
tremely difficult to disqualify a judge for having received contributions from a litigant or her lawyer,
even though there is ample evidence to suggest that these contributions create not only the appear-
ance of bias but also actual bias in judicial decision-making.") (footnotes omitted). Stricter recusal
standards may be necessary not merely in light of the receipt of campaign contributions but also in
connection with things which have been said in judicial campaigns. See also Thomas R. Phillips &
Karlene Dunn Poll, Free Speech for Judges and Fair Appeals for Litigants: Judicial Recusal in a
Post-White World, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 691, 707-20 (2007) (focusing on recusal in view of campaign
statements made by candidates).
212. Greene, supra note 149, at 602. The utility of the voter's guide will vary, among other
things, depending on the relevance of the information to judicial performance; the adequacy of the
mechanisms used to collect the information; how effectively the information is conveyed to the
voters; and whether the voters are motivated to review the information.
Nothing could be done to remove the incentive on elected courts to favor local voters in
cases where the parties before the court are not all local voters, especially since the judge's future
position depends on the good opinion of the voters. Although a judge will not be able to tell whether
a local voter had voted for her in the past, every local voter is a potential voter for the judge, and
every non-local voter is not a potential voter.
213. Cross & Fortune, supra note 209, at 643. Despite such committees, false and misleading
attack advertisements may still deceive the public into voting for the judge who is the beneficiary of
the attack against her opponent.
214. For an example of govemmental screening, see Rules of the Chief Admin Judge, supra
note 179. A New York commission had previously recommended state sponsored screening of
candidates for election. See COMM'N TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS,
REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 15-26 (2004), available at
http://law.fordham.edu/commission /judicialelections/images/jud-freport.pdf.
215. Anthony Champagne, Tort Reform and Judicial Selection, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1483,
1513-14 (2005). See also Tolson, supra note 188, stating that:
Texas is one of only four states that uses partisan elected races for all of its state courts.
Some states opt for nonpartisan races, but [former Texas Supreme Court Chief Justice
Tom] Phillips and others say removing the label does not eliminate many of the problems
of partisan races, including the involvement of special-interest groups, the need to raise
money and curry votes, and the lack of voter knowledge of judicial candidates.
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2. Commission-Based Appointments: Already an American
Institution
There is an important difference between American judicial selec-
tion reform and international rule of law reform. Since Americans are
reforming their own system, the risk of a bad, improper or ill-fitting rule
of law reform is less likely. In addition, the proposed reform is not alien
to Americans; rather, it is very much an American institution. Commis-
sion-based appointive systems are in effect in various states already; they
were first established in Missouri in 1940;216 and Americans have experi-
ence with them. There is no need to deal with the problem of a strange
or inhospitable institution in the nature of an unreceptive transplant mov-
ing from one country to another which may be a concern in international
development work.217 Nor should cost be an issue as in the case of inter-
national reform. The change to a commission-based appointment system
may even be less costly than an election system since it will eliminate
campaign money-raising and campaigning itself.2 18 Moreover, the ap-
pointment system which is to replace an election system should be a
model system which may be the same as or superior to other appointment
systems now or previously in place.219
One requirement for reform applies to both developing nations and
the United States: a political will for change. As stated with respect to
developing nations:
Rule-of-law reform will succeed only if it gets at the fundamental
problem of leaders who refuse to be ruled by the rule of law....
Even the new generation of politicians arising out of the political
transitions of recent years are reluctant to support reforms that create
competing centers of authority beyond their control.
220
216. Rachel P. Caufield, How the Pickers Pick: Finding a Set of Best Practices for Judicial
Nominating Commissions, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 163, 170 (2007).
217. See Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant Effect,
51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163, 167-68 (2003); Haggard et al., supra note 27, at 221 ("[N]otwithstanding
the passion of the development policy community for spreading judicial best practice, caution should
be exercised in the introduction of an alien legal system.").
218. See, e.g., Kelley Armitage, Denial Ain't Just a River in Egypt: A Thorough Review of
Judicial Elections, Merit Selection, and the Role of State Judges in Society, 29 CAP. U.L. REv. 625,
647 (2002). Especially since there may be a cost-savings by eliminating judicial elections, there is
no question of added costs to consider. Nor should there be the same concern of scarcity of re-
sources that otherwise may be important when deciding on rule of law reforms in developing coun-
tries. The United States is not a "developing" country with the same resource concerns, at least not
on the same scale. Developing countries may also need to choose between various rule of law
reforms, such as between reforming their criminal law or commercial law, increasing their compe-
tency and efficiency, and enhancing the government's compliance with law. See, e.g., Thomas
Carothers, The Rule-of-Law Revival, in PROMOTING, supra note 10, at 7-8 (2006) (identifying type
one, type two, and type three reforms). It is unlikely that any state in the United States would need
to make the same choice between improving its criminal or civil law-which may well not need any
substantial reform in any case-and reforming its judicial selection methods.
219. See Greene, supra note 171, at 13-14.
220. Carothers, Steps Toward Knowledge, in PROMOTING, supra note 10, at 4.
[Vol. 86:1
2008] LESSONS IN JUDICIAL REFORM
It would be unfair to suggest that those who support judicial elec-
tions do so because they believe that judicial elections subvert the rule of
law. Rather, one may only assume that the supporters share the same
values that the opponents of elections do on judicial impartiality and
fairness, but that they differ on the means to achieve them. However, in
order to bring about change in the United States as well as abroad, a po-
litical will to accomplish it is needed.22
E. Reflections on the Money Race in State Judicial Elections: What to Do
in the Meantime and the Next Steps
The argument that special interest groups should cease the money
race in judicial elections is a difficult one to make, especially since some
groups think that campaign spending brings at least short-term bene-
fits. 222  However, those benefits seem to be offset by substantial costs,
221. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 73 (2003)
("To gain traction with the public, judicial selection must achieve the status of a movement.... [and
capitalize] on catalyzing events that galvanize public opinion and give [the] movement focus and
drive."). In most states which have judicial elections, the requirement is in their constitutions, re-
quiring a constitutional amendment in order to effectuate change. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine,
The False Promise of Judicial Elections in Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 559, 560 (2002). The 2008
judicial elections showed a positive trend toward expanding commission-based appointment systems
in certain counties in Alabama (for vacancy appointments) and Missouri and retaining a commis-
sion-based appointment system in a county in Kansas. American Judicature Society, Voters in Four
Jurisdictions Opt for Merit Selection on November 4 [2008],
http://www.ajs.org/selection/sel-voters.asp (last visited November 9, 2008).
222. Olson, supra note 138. Olson is a senior fellow at The Manhattan Institute who has writ-
ten favorably about tort reform and against excessive litigation in the United States. See Manhattan
Institute for Policy Research, Walter Olson, http://www.manhattan-institute.org/htmllolson.htm.
The 2008 elections showed some of the polarization noted by Olson, including in the Michigan
Supreme Court race in which incumbent Cliff Taylor was defeated. See Zachary Gorchow, Hatha-
way pulls off an upset in Michigan Supreme Court race, DET. FREE PRESS, Nov. 5, 2008, available
at http://www.freep.com/article/20081105/NEWS15/811050449?imw=Y ("Business interests and
Republicans said Taylor and his fellow conservatives have taken a more literal interpretation of the
law that has created a better climate to do business in Michigan. But Democrats and plaintiffs'
attorneys said Taylor has been part of a majority that has overturned years of precedent and stacked
the deck against individuals trying to sue businesses and government."). An advertisement in the
Michigan Supreme Court campaign made a contested charge that Taylor had slept on a case. Justice
at Stake, Attack Ad Targets "Sleeping Judge ", Oct. 24, 2008, available at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/ThisWeek/24Oct08.htm#article2. The fact that the sleeping charge
may have been untrue raises the possibility that voters may not merely have voted without knowl-
edge of the candidates but on the basis of false information concerning the candidates. See also
Dawson Bell, Balance Tilts on State Supreme Court, DET. FREE PRESS, Nov. 6, 2008, available at
http://www.freep.com/article/20081106/NEWS 15/811060419/1215/NEWS 15 (although Taylor
denied the charge, "[t]he sleeping judge ad, coupled with multiple phone, mail and in-person voter
contacts from party and interest group activists, appeared to have been particularly effective.").
Attack advertisements likewise beset Taylor's opponent. See Ben Timmins, Michigan Chief Justice
Loses in Nation's "Dirtiest Campaign", http://www.gavelgrab.org/?p=701 (last visited Nov. 11,
2008) ("Ads by the state Republican Party and the Michigan Chamber of Commerce portrayed
Hathaway as soft on terrorism and sexual predators, while serving as a County Circuit Court
Judge.").
In 2008, Mississippi's Supreme Court judicial elections reportedly ranked "among the
nastiest in modem state history--this time with third-parties slinging the mud." Jerry Mitchell, Third
party mud prompts cries for election reforms, THE CLARION-LEDGER, Nov. 9, 2008, available at
http://www.clarionledger.com/article/20081109/NEWS/811090363/1001/RSSO]. See also id.
(third-party advertisements in 2008 Mississippi Supreme Court elections unfairly attack candidates,
including, among other things, by an advertisement accusing candidate of supporting baby-killers;
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and today's prevailing party in judicial elections may be tomorrow's
loser. As a commentator noted in observing pro-business gains in judi-
cial elections:
[I]t is a mistake to observe a tide that has been sweeping out to sea,
and conclude that it will continue to sweep out indefinitely. It is hard
to deny that the substantive improvement in some of these courts has
been bought at a cost of politicization and polarization which inevita-
bly invites the other side to respond in kind when its day comes.223
Justice Stephen Breyer expressed a similar thought in an interview
regarding the structural damage to democracy threatened by election
battles over the courts:
no disclosure required by third-parties of source of contributions to such advertisements under
Mississippi law).
223. Olson, supra note 138. But see posting of Walter Olson to PointofLaw.com,
http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/2008/07/judicial-elections-some-reacti.php (July 17, 2008,
23:59 EST) (providing links to some positive and negative reactions to the prior Olson article). For
a positive reaction, see, for example, posting of Dale Carpenter to The Volokh Conspiracy,
http://www.volokh.com/posts/1216311330.shtml (July 17, 2008 23:15 EST) ("Olson makes a good
argument and provides some evidence that, on the whole, business interests are better served by a
merit system where the judges themselves are more likely to understand the law and try to apply it in
a principled way."). For Dale Carpenter's website, see Dale Carpenter's Faculty Profile, University
of Minnesota Law, http://www.law.umn.edu/facultyprofiles/carpenterd.html (last visited Oct. 14,
2008).
Some negative reactions express the concern that commission-based appointment systems
may be unfair. Among other things, they contend that commissions are dominated by elites or other
special interests, are unaccountable to any elected officials, and operate in secret; some prefer the
views of at least some elected judges as well. See Dan Pero, A Dissent to Olson's Dissent, The
American Courthouse, http://americancourthouse.com2008/07/17/a-dissent-to-olsons-dissent.html
(July 17, 2008), noting how "rule of law judges"-which the author uses synonymously with judges
supporting a particular point of view as opposed to "rule of law" in its traditional sense-have had
great success recently in winning elections. See also Kathy Barks Hoffman, Ever-More-Expensive
Court Races Heading Higher, Assoc. Press, August 24, 2008, available at
http://www.mlive.com/news/index.ssf/2008/08/evermoreexpensive-courtraces.html, describing
Pero's position as follows: "Dan Pero, head of the American Justice Partnership, makes no bones
about the fact that his group wants to get more business-friendly judges on state courts." But the use
of the phrase "rule of law" to describe judges as pre-committed to any class of litigants, pro-business
or otherwise-rather than to characterize them as dedicated to the notions of independence, imparti-
ality and accountability-violates the phrase's generally accepted meaning.
Also, the Pero argument, like others of the same sort, focuses on perceived flaws in cer-
tain commission-based appointment systems; relies on words with connotations intended to be
negative, such as trial lawyers, unaccountable, secret and elite to characterize them; overlooks or
minimizes the flaws in judicial election systems, including the influence of money and lack of
screening of candidates; ignores the world-wide peculiarity of the system of electing judges, with
judges being appointed essentially everywhere else; and disregards the development and variability
of commission-based appointment systems. See e.g., Symposium on Rethinking Judicial Selection: A
Critical Appraisal of Appointive Selection for State Court Judges, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (2007)
(including my model judicial appointment legislation, Greene, supra note 171, at 21-34). See also
Statement of Gordon L. Doerfer, Regarding Recent Attacks on Merit Selection Systems, American
Judicature Society (Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.ajs.org/ajs/ajs-whatsnew-statement.asp:
The composition and selection of nominating commissions is different in each state ....
A blanket condemnation of judicial nominating commissions is irresponsible and mis-
leading. Thirty-three states use merit selection to choose some or all of their judges.
[T]he vast majority of merit selection systems operate without political controversy and
promote public confidence in the judges who are selected.
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[11f you have one group of people doing it, you'll get another group
of people doing it. And if you have A contributing to ... affect a
court one way, you'll have B trying the other way. And you'll have C
yet a third way and pretty soon you'll have a clash of political inter-
ests. Now, that's fine for a legislature. I mean that's one kind of a
problem. But if you have that in the court system, you will then de-
stroy confidence that the judges are deciding things on the merits...
. And as I said our liberties are connected with that.
2 24
By accepting less control over judges now, and agreeing to imparti-
ality rather than judges aligned with one's current preferences, even
powerful interest groups may mitigate their losses when they fall out of
225power.
One might wonder how the world was able to stop the missile race
which was theoretically harder or more dangerous. Although the com-
petitors did not unilaterally disarm, they certainly explored the options
for ending the race while maintaining their defenses. While expecting
unilateral disarmament by either side in the judicial election wars may be
unrealistic, all concerned should consider whether there is a better way
than the uniquely American mode of electing state court judges and how
it may be implemented. In addition, campaign contributors should fur-
ther consider the importance of the rule of law, how dangerous this con-
tinued conduct may be for the rule of law, and whether they should con-
tinue to support this practice.
Therefore, while not asking any special interest group to cease their
spending on judicial elections, this article suggests that all those involved
investigate and support alternatives, including individuals and groups
who are working for them. Such alternatives potentially include the elec-
tion reforms mentioned above but, most importantly, the end of judicial
elections and the development and use of well-designed commission-
based judicial appointment systems to replace them.226 In the meantime,
questions remain over what is happening to the rule of law in the United
States; how severely is our democracy being damaged; what is the finan-
cial cost to our economy; and who is being affected and how.
224. Frontline, supra note 148.
225. See J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 741-43 (1994). Judicial independence is part of a trade which political
parties are willing to make depending on their view as to whether they believe that they will have to
cede political power at some future time. Parties expecting to lose political power at some point are
more willing to accept independent judges than those expecting never to lose. Id.
226. An additional alternative is public funding of judicial elections; however, for reasons
stated in this article and elsewhere, that reform would still not remove many problems with judicial
elections. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Publicly Financed Judicial Elections: An Overview, 34 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 1467, 1478-80 (2001).
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CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
The laws are upheld, and access to justice is provided, by compe-
tent, independent, and ethical law enforcement officials, attorneys or
representatives, and judges who are of sufficient number, have adequate
resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve.227
This article seeks to shift the dialogue in the judicial selection de-
bate to the rule of law and economic development and take the lessons
learned from the international development sphere home. Thus it begins
this conclusion by quoting a key definition by the World Justice Project
of the rule of law.
Analyzing judicial elections through the lens of the rule of law
raises substantial concern that judicial elections are threatening or caus-
ing violations of the rule of law.228 At a minimum, judicial elections and
the rule of law are difficult to reconcile; 229 however, the better view is
that they are irreconcilable.23 ° If judges are favoring or appearing to fa-
vor campaign contributors or local voters, they are disregarding key
components of the rule of law, including fairness, impartiality, independ-
ence, and accountability. Also, "to live under the rule of law is not to be
subject to the unpredictable vagaries of other individuals;,, 23' and if
judges are subject to the preferences of campaign contributors and local
voters, litigants and potential litigants are in that very unpredictable posi-
tion. Nor do elections maximize the selection of qualified judges, let
alone the selection of judges for their understanding of the rule of law.
There is no appropriate screening mechanism for those purposes.
If one were to compare the U.S. judicial system to that of develop-
ing countries, despite its flaws, the American system may come out bet-
ter overall. "Every lawyer in a developed country can point to numerous
shortcomings in his own country. Yet judiciaries in developing countries
frequently fall far short of developed country standards. 232 But that is
227. The World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index, supra note 51 (stating the World Justice
Project's four principles of the rule of law).
228. By suggesting that the rule of law be applied to the United States, the article in essence is
suggesting that the telescope be turned backward to determine whether rule of law violations are
occurring in the United States as well as internationally and to assess whether the United States
economy is being undermined as well.
229. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 803 (2008) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
230. See e-mail from Simon R. Contd, Director, Research & Program Development, American
Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative, to author (July 16, 2008, 10:44 EST) (on file with author and
Denver University Law Review). See e.g., Kleinfeld, supra note 10, at 53 ("The highly political
process of judicial choice in the United States would never be permitted by reformers elsewhere.").
See also Burnett, supra note 127, at 281-82.
231. TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 122.
232. DAM, supra note 62, at 96. See also Daniel Kaufmann, Illinois Governor Blagojevich:
sign of endentic corruption in the US?, The Kaufmann Governance Post,
http://thekaufmannpost.net/illinois-govemor-blagojevich-sign-of-endemic-corruption-in-the-
us/#more-505 (Dec. 11, 2008) (last visited Jan. 5, 2009) ("Granted, the US in general is not a model
for the world in terms of control of corruption. Countries like New Zealand and the Nordics are
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little solace for an American litigant damaged in a case where the rule of
law has failed. The economic damage may be widespread or just in par-
ticular states or courts. But for the company or other litigants involved in
an unfair decision-its workers and its shareholders, or their families-a
repair will come too late.233
Policymakers spend billions of dollars on rule of law reforms inter-
nationally because they believe, among other things, that the rule of law
and economic development are related. The strength of the connection is
open to discussion. But even those raising questions are reluctant to
deny any relationship and call for the expenditures to stop. The interna-
tional financial commitment, its rationale, and international learning
overall are too substantial to ignore.
Finally, the rule of law is not something that is only applicable to
other countries but rather is fully applicable to the United States. 234 It is
risky to assume that Americans are the only people in the world who
abide by the rule of law; indeed, this assumption overlooks much of our
past and present history and ignores critiques from respected sources.
American-based or sponsored organizations are trying to uphold the rule
of law worldwide; yet if they do not uphold the rule of law in the United
States, this may be a proverbial case in which the shoemaker's children
have no shoes.235
Americans should carefully consider whether state court judicial
elections violate the rule of law; if so, whether they may disregard the
relationship at home between the rule of law and economic development;
and whether the violation mandates an end to judicial elections. This
article submits that the case has been made; that further study of the
available options and next steps should be undertaken; and that the way
closer to being a model of integrity instead. There are 18 countries rating better than the US in
controlling corruption according to the Worldwide Governance Indicators. Yet there are about 190
countries rating worse.").
233. The focus of this article is on the economic effects of rule of law violations, rather than
violations of individual rights. The rule of law concerns reflected in this article, however-e.g., lack
of judicial independence-would also apply to individual rights. See Theodor Mearon, Judicial
Independence and Impartiality in International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 359-60
(2005):
Judicial independence is also instrumental in the protection of individual rights. Such
rights may be enshrined in the country's constitution or laws, but an authority, such as the
courts, must be empowered to review, independently and impartially, citizens' complaints
and, if necessary, order that infringed rights be vindicated. To do so effectively, judges
must be assured that, irrespective of their ruling, no unpleasant repercussions will be vis-
ited on them in terms of threats of dismissal, demotion, or even salary diminution.
234. See, e.g., World Justice Project, Domestic Mainstreaming of the Rule of Law, supra note
5.
235. See The Shoemaker's Children, MICE Website, http://mice.org/blog/about/the-
shoemakers-children/ ("[Tihe phrase, 'The shoemaker's children has no shoes' . .. [m]eans ....
[w]hatever a person's skill or talent, those closest to her or him rarely benefit. The proverb appeared
in John Heywood's book of proverbs in 1546. It was used by Robert Burton (1577-1640) in 'The
Anatomy of Melancholy' (1621-51).").
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